

Working Life, Well-Being and Welfare Reform: Motivation and Institutions Revisited

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Summary. — This article revisits the relation between economic institutions and motives to work. It proposes moving away from a dominant polemical focus on the impact of a single source of security (income support), towards a multi-factorial analysis based on control over working life as a source of well-being and motivation to work. Drawing on surveys of two urban constituencies in São Paulo, Brazil, it is found that income security supports an Aristotelian principle of work motivation as individual development. However labour market institutions and opportunity levels affect this link. Implications include a need to consider the distribution of economic control as a key aspect of both human and economic development.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The expansion of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) in recent years has given rise to controversy about their motivational impact. The effect has been to strengthen an overly simple approach by which income security supports the desire to pursue self-development goals in the form of non-work or leisure (the leisure-work trade-off).

In this article we consider a different hypothesis whereby an Aristotelian principle of self-development motivation can also apply, and explore its conditions. In particular we are interested in how far self-development motives increase in the measure that different forms of security solidify an overall sense of economic stability and control over work.

To pursue this hypothesis we propose a multi-factorial method in the form of an occupational model comprising of both different senses and sources of work motivation. The occupational model allows that work can (also) be enjoyed for itself and as a source of personal growth. Use of this more extended prism then enables us to consider how far, and contrary to conventional wisdom, economic security can diminish trade-offs between work and self-development goals, and the analytical and policy implications that follow.

The proposed framework allows us to do this in the following ways. First, by adding occupational goals, it moves us beyond a concern with labour supply to explore the motivations that guide strategic behaviour. Second, by using a multi-institutional prism, it affords us a more expanded view of the sequence through which strategic motivation unfolds. It does this by allowing us to observe the motivational impacts of different combinations between sources of security that are sequentially linked, namely schooling, employment stability (including short unemployment) and income support. A consequence of this in turn is to take us away from the narrowness of the incentive polemic both in terms of the singular focus on income security, and as regards the empty definition, and yet procedural primacy, of individual autonomy. As concerns the disincentive assumption specifically, which prioritises individual morality, an effect of introducing wider social and institutional factors as constitutive of personal control, is to bestow on the emphasis on preferences and choice some dynamic content and practical context. In other words, by

seeking to observe how institutional sources of security furnish a sense of stability and personal control, and in doing so give developed preferences flight, the occupational model allows us to understand motivation both as a process and as a social condition. Finally, and as an extension of this, our inclusion of several forms of security—the security set—allows us to probe how conditions conducive to personal control and intrinsic motivation might vary depending on overall context. For instance, it is conceivable that sensations of control require access to more extended combinations of economic security in economies that are characterised by higher or more complex forms of economic uncertainty.

To assess these hypotheses the article draws on two surveys in São Paulo city funded by the Leverhulme Trust and the British Academy as part of a project by the author to study the impacts of economic security. The surveys, both of 2004, consider more and less marginal groups, which are at the same time affected by cross-cutting opportunities relating to income support, employment and schooling. An advantage of this heterogeneous prism is that it allows us to move beyond the exclusive analysis of social strata where, given weak opportunities, it is predictable that a single source of security (e.g., income support) will have little effect.

With this in view then the discussion proceeds in the following manner: Section 2 introduces the disincentive polemic and considers issues in the measurement of motives to work. Section 3 elaborates on the rationale for an alternative, occupational (multi-factorial) model, including implications for general debates about institutions and values. Section 4 introduces the context and methodology of the Brazilian case study, and some general findings. Section 5 applies the occupational model in greater detail. The conclusion draws some

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broad implications for welfare analysis and for public reform.

2. INCOME SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES TO WORK

The 1980s and 1990s in Latin America saw a rise in income protection as a state response to rising poverty and more precarious employment (Haagh, 1999, 2002; Gonzaga, 2003; IDB, 2004; Medeiros, Britto, and Soares, 2008, p. 17; Standing, 1999, 2008; Tokman, 2007). Brazil was one of the first countries to set up an unemployment insurance scheme (UI), in 1988, followed in the 1990s by conditional cash transfers (or CCTs) (Haagh, 2006, 2007; Hall, 2006; Rawlings, 2005; Vodopivec, 2004). Altogether cash transfers have been estimated to protect almost a quarter of Brazil's population by 2006 (Paes de Barros, Carvalho, and Franco, 2007b, p. 15; Medeiros *et al.*, 2008, p. 17).¹

A consequence of the growing focus on income support was a mounting concern with moral hazard as it was felt that individuals might come to rely on protection in preference to work (the leisure-work trade-off or LWTO). According to Moore (2008, p. 4), the "dismal" health impacts of grants in Honduras was the result of a policy—mainly geared by external donors—to reduce disincentives by limiting grants to a fraction (as low as 5%) of a family's needs. In general, the moral hazard or disincentive assumption is expressed in a fear of stabilising expectations given a presumed trade-off (deriving from neo-classical economics) between security (or leisure) and work motivation (Deakin & Wilkinson, 1992; Barry, 1997; Ranis, 1997; Solow, 2001, p. 12; World Bank, 2005, p. 154; 2001, p. 149). A preference for leisure is taken to exist, and to present a moral problem, wherever the poor reduce their labour supply. Ravallion (2003, p. 11), for instance, implies that, for the poor, a long-term perspective (the pursuit of stable jobs) is a form of moral hazard (or unproductive behaviour). The neo-conservative model accepts the social problems that affect the poor, but assumes motivation to be so low in this strata as to require the external supervision of individual behaviour (Mead, 1997, pp. 5, 14–15, 22–25).

The literature on incentive effects from economic security also tends to focus on income support. A good example, for instance, of a direct response to the disincentive assumption is the campaign for a basic income (BI) or the extension to all (citizens or residents), irrespective of means and of work-test, of a regular grant (van Parijs, 1995, 2001). Notably, the case that is made for a BI is not only or even mainly to do with work motivation or with marginal groups. For many, the primary gain from stable grants lies in the freedom to pursue activities that in a neo-classical model would come under leisure (van Parijs, 1995, 2001). This notwithstanding, it is often argued that the guarantee of subsistence supports motivation by raising the poor's control over work, including of formal employment (Haarmann & Haarmann, 2007; Lavinias, Barbosa, & Tourinho, 2001; Rothschild, 2001; Samson, 2006; Seekings, 2007; Standing, 2008; Suplicy, 2007). Proponents emphasize improvements in the poor's self-organisation, productive engagement and strategic behaviour (Samson, 2006). This is similar to incentive arguments made in the wider literature in relation to basic assets as a source of self-employment support (Gertler, Martinez, & Rubio, 2006).

In summary, proponents of the disincentive and incentive assumptions face the same two methodological problems: both hinge their core argument on the impact of one single source of security (income support). And both apply this model pri-

marily to marginal groups with weak access to other forms of support.

This approach presents a problem for several reasons. First, there are doubts as to how far the value or stability of income support itself are strong enough to have either disincentive or incentive effects in Latin America. Although CCTs are generally understood to have reduced inequality of income and poverty (Soares, Ribas, & Osório, 2007, pp. 4–6), it is often argued that grants are too low (da Silva e Silva, 2008, p. 7), or/and their duration too short (de la Brière & Rawlings, 2006; Medeiros *et al.*, 2008, pp. 5, 15–16; Soares & Britto, 2007a, 2007b, pp. 14–15, 26–27). For instance, the Bolsa Família Programme in the case of Brazil adds, on average, a mere 11% to recipients' incomes (Medeiros *et al.*, 2008, p. 10). It pays less than half the minimum wage (Soares, Soares, Medeiros, & Osório, 2006, p. 28) as compared with one minimum wage on the non-contributory pension.

But more importantly, it is hard to see how motivational impacts of income support can be understood without reference to work itself, in particular where its supply has been weak. Income from labour in Brazil can be linked to falling inequality and the lowering of poverty (the extent to which is debated—Hoffmann, 2005, 2005; Paes de Barros, Carvalho, & Franco, 2007a, 2007b; Soares, Soares, Medeiros, & Guerreiro, 2007). The role in this however of formal employment is relative. According to Zepeda, Alarcón, Soares, and Osório (2007), the poor raised their income share slightly during 1996–2004 (0.9% compared to an average contraction of 1.6%). But, as the authors also show, and as argued by Paes de Barros, de Carvalho, Franco, and Mendonça (2009, p. 11) and Machado and Ribas (2008, 20), this occurred parallel with a fall in the poor's access to formal jobs and during a time of economic contraction where participation in informal jobs was necessarily stretched. An ILO study estimated 50% of workers in Brazil and 70% in Chile to have unstable incomes in 2004 (ILO, 2004, p. 92). In this context, can we really assume anything generic about motivation, or morality, from the incidence of income support or from labour supply?

The available evidence could be read to indicate that problems of labour supply are only weakly connected to grants. As reported in Soares, Ribas, and Osório (2007, p. 6), for instance, cash grants have been found to have neutral effects on labour supply in Colombia (Attanasio, Meghir, & Vera-Hernandez, 2004), a neutral or only marginally positive impact in Mexico (Parker & Skoufias 2000), and mildly positive effects in Brazil (Oliveira *et al.*, 2007; see also Lavinias *et al.*, 2001; Medeiros *et al.*, 2008). In the case of unemployment insurance, evidence for a leisure-work trade-off is also weak. Despite what is generally accepted as lax or non-existent enforcement of job-search requirements (Chahad, 2004, p. 159), 44% of recipients have been found to be working (and another 14% to be actively looking for jobs, Chahad, 2004, p. 159).

The extent to which grants have an impact on labour supply appears to be strongly dependent on other conditions. Several studies for instance document how assistance has incentive effects in areas where individuals can invest in livestock or other productive resources (Gertler *et al.*, 2006, pp. 2–3; Ravallion, 2003, pp. 2–5; Samson, 2006; Soares, Ribas, & Hirata, 2008, p. 17). Soares *et al.* (2008, p. 20) in their study of Paraguay observed that males doing seasonal work slightly reduced their supply, as grants, it is indicated, enabled them to reject exploitative work. A study by Medeiros *et al.* (2008, p. 11) found that mothers withdraw time from paid employment when receiving a grant. In the case of unemployment

insurance, repeated dependency has been linked to low opportunity sets and insecure jobs (Neto & Zylberstein, 2002, p. 85).

Labour supply however is not always a good indicator of work motivation. A study of South Asian villages showed (echoing the findings above) that high labour supply at low wages is in effect an over-supply based on economic distress (Sharif, 2003, pp. 48–52, 88–102). On the other hand, Sharif also found that poor people withdraw work below a certain subsistence threshold (for instance, their calorific intake is low, (Sharif, 2003, pp. 160–162, 171). Either way, the point is that an increase or decrease in labour supply which is largely determined by poverty is not obviously indicative of a kind of motivation that is likely to be sustained or to grow.

Moreover, Latin American countries like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are all characterised by high inequalities not only of school attainment but of quality schooling.² High and rising income returns continue to be concentrated amongst higher earners (Zepeda, Alarcón, Soares, Osório, 2009, pp. 10, 18) and to be defined by tertiary relative to other levels of schooling. Returns to intermediate levels in particular is growing more slowly (Bouillon, Legovini, & Lustig, 2001; Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Lustig, 2004; Duryea *et al.*, 2003; IADB, 1998, 2004; Kakwani, Neri, & Son, 2006, p. 23; Soares *et al.*, 2006). Together then with the rise of more precarious work this suggests that insecurity as a policy challenge extends far beyond the problem of income support: job insecurity may also frustrate the motivating impact of additional (and rising) schooling. We need therefore to look at motivation itself as something prior and possibly distinct to labour supply in order that the long-run intentions that are likely to guide behaviour can be brought into view. In this (longer-term) context, in turn, it is possible and pertinent to soften the common distinction between schooling, as a source of opportunity and motivation to learn, and income support, as a source of security: Arguably schooling is also a source of security (in access to better jobs) and income support is a source of opportunity (to look for these jobs). Stable employment is a source of secure opportunity for continued learning. Then, looking at the combined effects of these institutions on individual persons, through time, affords an analytical lens through which to assess motivation as a problem of control over working life as a whole. With this in mind, we outline, in the section to follow, the basis for a factorially diversified model both of work motivation itself and of its contextual basis.

3. WELL-BEING, CONTROL AND WORK MOTIVATION

A first requirement of a diversified model, as noted, is that we recognize motivation as being more than a function of income support. The alternative proposed begins by linking motivation to individual control. The general value of this is well expressed in Rawls' (1971, pp. 374–376) version of the Aristotelian principle which ties our enjoyment in doing things to our interest in learning. As aspect of this, for Rawls, is that purposeful reason pertains even under duress, as, in the case (1971, p. 378) of the prisoner who, given a seeming excess of time, takes particular care in lacing his shoes. What is identified here, then, as a strategic search for personal control and a structure in tasks is helpful in that it expands our analytical lens beyond the immediate present. This enables us to consider how intrinsic motives relate strategically to more instrumental or immediate concerns. In addition, we can speculate about the role in this context of different forms of security, including how the greater sense of stability and personal control their

combination can furnish might impinge on intrinsic motives to work.

The general idea that motivation is linked to stability finds support in a wide range of disciplines. For instance, it is broadly supposed in the comparative literature on institutions that overall purpose safeguards (Williamson, 1996, pp. 267–272) and stable ownership (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2003, 2002; Chang & Evans, 2004; Pagano, 1991) are important to the sustained strategic or/and planning roles of organisations and agents. Our model extends this general hypothesis by exploring underlying features of motivation and particular contextual elements of ownership that—in relation to work—can be supposed to enhance it. Sustained links between sources of security, such as schooling, employment and income security are thought to increase the sense of ownership through the overall experience of stability and therefore control. In short, the notion here that control is a deep-seated aspect of motivation, the drive to which the sense of stability speaks, is a hypothesis concerning the developmental nature of motivation itself.

The salience of this account of well-being and our pursuit of it is supported by studies on patterns of human development and well-being in neuro-science and hedonic psychology. As an example, North, in explaining why institutions, by reducing uncertainty, enhance motivation, points to neuro-science research (North, 2005, pp. 14, 27–30) that has linked “experimental behaviour and the structure of everyday... life” (North, p. 47). Humans naturally innovate through “pattern-based reasoning.” “Learning entails ‘incrementally modifying our behaviour ever so slightly’ (North, p. 26)”. Findings in hedonic psychology too indicate that well-being is tied to “the [process of] attaining control over economic and personal aspects of life (Peterson, 2003, p. 288, brackets added), and how far ‘life goals’ have a tangible relationship with... daily life.” (Cantor & Sanderson, 2003, p. 231; see also; Kahneman, 1999, pp. 17,18; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In a similar vein, industrial sociologists emphasize the role of stability in our pursuit of well-being given its effect on our control over time. For Sennett (2008, p. 39), for instance, occupational definition, and the well-being that is linked to learning a trade, evolves from stable learning and repeated practice. Survivalist competition and external morality, on the other hand, are regarded as causes of de-motivation (2008, p. 35). Competitive collaboration can be compatible with self-driven motives, but only where a temporal structure of (continuous) doing or learning obtains Sennett (2008, p. 33–35).

From these accounts of motivation and control, and the instrumental role of stability, three implications for operationalising the occupational model can be argued to follow. First, intrinsic motivation, the enjoyment of work for its own sake, is a key source of well-being that tends to increase as uncertainty falls and the sense of stability grows. Second, individuals are likely, for this reason, to strategize to reduce uncertainty through attaining control over work—over time. However, and thirdly, individuals cannot attain an overall framework of stability on their own. They need institutions.

This in turn sets out the problem as it is connected to the welfare debate: For instance, the way, in the occupational model, that schooling and working are seen as affecting motivation in a similar, structured way, is at odds with their formal separation, in neo-classical theory (in the leisure-work trade-off). In neo-classical theory, work motivation is tied to price, not to goals associated with learning, or the stability (in addition to) the level of, pay. In fact, this de-linking is what sustains a universal motivational theory (the leisure-work

trade-off) that dissociates work from motivation itself (by tying intrinsic motives wholly to leisure). Moreover, because the leisure-work trade-off model only considers motives associated with survival and pay it does not have an internal means of counter-factual check.

By contrast, the occupational model is more ambitious—and pluralist—in explanatory—and factorial—terms, in so far it begins with intrinsic motivation as a human potential, incidental to which are then various sources of destruction or growth of self-development motives. In this context, instrumental or purely material concerns, for example higher pay or a search for security, are included as possible motives to work. However these would be supposed to fit somewhere within a broader model, e.g. as having a strategic direction or/and to be induced by specific constraints.

Notably, what follows in the form of a potential close link between instrumental and intrinsic motives is different in important ways from Inglehart's otherwise similar work on materialist and post-materialist values. Inglehart and colleagues depict, through the World Value Surveys, how, for postwar generations in the West, greater affluence entailed "emphases on freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life" or post-materialist values (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995, p. xi). This contrasts with societies in which uncertainty induces a first-order strive to attain economic security (the scarcity hypothesis), supporting in the process the survival of materialist values (2000, p. 3).

From this it is apparent that the occupational model shares with Inglehart's work an emphasis on security as a motivational driver. The level of analysis however in the two models is different in relevant ways. Whereas Inglehart focuses largely on macro-social trends and slow-changing values (the socialisation hypothesis), the concern, in the occupational model, with personal trajectories, allows greater scope for observing intrinsic motivation under shifting and/or materially imperfect conditions, the latter as in the case of the prisoner, in Rawls (above). The question becomes therefore not (only) how institutions create intrinsic motivation, but (also) how they support what can be considered an already latent tendency in human development. This concern, then, with individual strategies, and their support, may render the occupational model better able to uncover the complex bases for motivation in institutionally fragmented and uncertain economies.

For instance, Abramson and Inglehart (1995, p. 3) separate out intrinsic motives as pertaining to highly skilled occupations and autonomous work in mainly affluent countries. This however potentially excludes the stability of the process of working as a source of motivation that is independent of the level of technical skill. Moreover, whereas Inglehart and colleagues link post-materialist values with the demise of materialist values, other studies suggest that the two reinforce each other under certain conditions. Note that Inglehart and colleagues observe that Swedes have highly developed post-materialist values (Inglehart, Basañez, & Moreno, 2001, pp. 7, 15–17). However Swedes also hold strong materialist values as expressed in their broad support of universalist (protective) welfare policies (Rothstein, 1998, pp. 166, 167).³ More specifically, Rothstein and Svallfors (1992, cited in Rothstein, 1998, pp. 135, 136) indicate that Swedes' high support for welfare policy is explained in a better welfare system alignment with ordinary pro-egalitarian citizen values (found to be broadly similar in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Germany). This macro-symbiosis then can be taken up as relevant, in a counter-factual sense, to the way individuals might strategize in societies where welfare policies are not so universal or exten-

sive and therefore economic uncertainty is generally high. In this case, individuals themselves will need to find material ways to support post-materialist goals.

What we end up with then are two kinds of hypotheses; the first a general one about the applicability of the occupational model to account for work motivation, and the second a more specific one about how this model applies in complex, unequal or/and uncertain economies. In the latter case the security set that is conducive to motivation is likely to be highly unstable and hard to determine. The reason for this is that its composition in relation to work motivation will differ significantly across individuals and groups given variation (uncertainty) in other parts of the set. Moreover this is likely to be the case both within broadly defined or heterogeneous groups as well as between groups whose opportunity sets are spatially divided. An important consequence thus is that in seeking to illuminate these conditions we require more fine-grained differentiations in our definition of both motivation and in our concern with security.

In response, I adopt two different definitions of intrinsic motivation (below), of which the second is more far-reaching as compared with the first. In the first case, respondents are asked to consider "what constitutes the most important thing about your present work or job" (this phrasing is shortened in the tables). Answers that point to "ever more interesting work" are considered to be indicative of intrinsic motivation at this level (or Motivation One). In contrast, answers that point to "stable pay," "work near the community" or "high pay" are considered to be in one way or another more instrumental. In the case of Motivation Two, respondents are asked what constitutes fulfilment in working life which is then a more extended notion about working life as compared with values about the immediate job. Answers that link fulfilment to "developing personal capacities" or "identifying with an occupation for life" are considered expressive of intrinsic forms of motivation (in relation to work in the long-run, or Motivation Two) in contrast with answers that focus on "a stable and formal job," "a professional and well-paid job" or having jobs that "one likes at the time."

We can surmise then that the distinction between the immediate job and working life as a whole allows us to identify intrinsic motives (at a lower level, or Motivation One) even in marginal areas where craftsmanship is conceivably only a latent potential. On the other hand, combined security may also be needed (for instance for Motivation Two) within less marginal groups. From an institutional perspective, as noted already, more uncertain and/or complex—economies can be assumed to demand more, and not less, differentiated forms of economic security. Against this background then the strategic behaviours that are observed in studies of CCTs and unemployment insurance (above) can be hypothesized to find a different expression (Motivation One or Two) depending on the overall combination of security already attained. In the next two sections we use as a means to explore this model two surveys of work motivation in urban Brazil.

4. ECONOMIC SECURITY IN SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL

Our choice of survey methodology follows broadly our discussion above of the occupational model and its applicability under different constraints. In respect to group variation, for instance, it would be important not only to assess a marginal group, but also to explore conditions where opportunity contexts are more varied and generally better. In regards, on the other hand, to the forms of security, it was thought that the

access to income support was critical to sample selection. In the case of São Paulo, these two criteria also happen to coincide with a marked spatial demarcation of poverty: groups of very low opportunity and income—and with access to grants—reside mainly (if not only) in slums; and groups with higher schooling, and access to unemployment insurance, reside in the city itself.

Taking account then of these different concerns it seemed conducive to organise two paired surveys in terms of receipt or otherwise of grants or insurance in two different localities. The command of other sources of economic security—for example, the more precise level of schooling as well as employment and unemployment type and length, would be random factors of the sample selections. More specifically, the two surveys we have comprise (in the form of valid responses): (1) a randomly selected set of 352 employment seekers at a job centre in São Paulo; and (2) a randomly selected set of 400 recipients of cash grants in slums. Both surveys were carried out at the same time within a four-week period in Autumn of 2004.⁴ Their basic characteristics are summed up in Table 1 (and Tables A.1 and A.2, Appendix), and discussed in more detail below.

As concerns the city survey, first, the treatment and control groups were drawn at random from the incidence of access to unemployment insurance (of about half of respondents). This

method has the advantage of insurance status forming a natural control group, and, as a function of this, of allowing us to assess the representativeness of the job-seeker sample. For instance, when we exclude those over 20 in informal jobs, coverage of UI in our sample is 69%, a figure that is reasonably close to the estimate made by Chahad (2004, p. 143) of 67% for Brazil (based on the late 1990s).⁵ In turn, in the slum, both treatment and control groups were drawn from public lists of eligible claimants, of which 182 (the control group, evenly drawn from both localities) were not yet in receipt of a grant. The treatment group had been in receipt of grants for a period of between a year and a year-and-a-half.⁶

The surveys' spatial dimension can be obtained from a mapping of the city's 96 districts (Table A.3.1, Appendix). In Table A.3.1, the areas shaded in pink and red comprise the group of 50 districts identified, in 2001 (Pochman, 2002, pp. 32, 48) as priority sites for the roll-out of the Renda Mínima scheme (a forerunner and version of the Bolsa Família). Of these, the first ten alone, encircled in black, encompassed 2.1 million residents (that is, nearly 20% of the city), of which 14.9% were covered by this or related schemes (by means-test), by December 2001 (Pochman, 2002, p. 122). The two red areas are the marginal districts from which the random selection of beneficiaries in our slum-dweller survey was drawn (São Luís and Lajeado). Meanwhile the residential circumference of

Table 1. *City job-seekers and slum-dweller profiles, by income security and district (for slums), mean*

	City insured 225	City uninsured 127	Slum with grants 218		Slum without grants 182	
			Lajeado	São Luís	Lajeado	São Luís
Age	32	26	36	37	39	37
<i>Schooling</i>						
1. Never at school	–	2	1	1	4	3
2. Up to 3rd grade of primary	1	3	18	16	22	19
3. Primary education (Pe) till grade 4	4	5	8	11	22	13
4. Pe of between 5 and 7 years	4	7	37	37	27	30
5. Pe complete (8 years)	8	15	5	6	12	10
6. Secondary education (Se) incomplete (years 9–10)	14	14	13	13	6	9
7. Se complete or nearly complete (year 11)	50	41	17	16	8	16
8. Higher education (He) incomplete (12 years)	7	6	1	–	–	–
9 He complete or more (13 or more)	11	7	–	–	–	–
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>Employment vulnerability</i>						
– Last job duration	32.5	17.9	22.4	30.5	26.5	27.8
– No of registers (all)	3.6	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.8	1.6
– No of registers (excl. those without)	4.0	2.7	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.7
– Employment vulnerability (Ratio of duration of unemployment to duration of employment)	1.5	1.8	2.9	2.8	2.0	2.5
– Last unemployment duration	12.5	9.8	28.4	32.3	26.9	25.6
– Distance	63	70	150–170	120–140	140–150	120–140
No. of children	.82	.60	2.22	2.23	2.23	2.15
<i>Occupation that has</i>						
– No mention of occupation	–	–	31	27	27	26
– Domestic or basic services, kitchen-help, transport, security	13	27	53	60	52	54
– Shop-assistants	26	25	2	2	1	5
– General independent services	23	13	8	5	15	1
– Manufacturing, teacher, nurse	16	13	3	5	5	11
– Prof. office positions (administrative, information, financial)	22	22	3	2	–	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

the job-seeker survey is roughly within the white-shaded area, on which more below. The blue dot is the location of the job-centre where sampling was done.

Next, looking at maps of social exclusion (Table A.3.2, from Pochman, 2003), gives us some idea of the social differences between the central district and São Luís and Lajeado (or, for short, city and slum). The first figure in Table A.3.2, as an example, identifies both São Luís and Lajeado as zones of very low levels of human development (following the UNDP definition). The last two indices, composed by the municipality labour department, classify both São Luís and Lajeado, but none of the white districts, as having “very low” levels of social inclusion (Pochman, 2003, p. 34). Meanwhile, none of the job-seeker respondents resided in the one district (Parí) which, within the white circumference (in Table A.3.2), was identified as a high risk domain.

Nevertheless, and despite these differences, there are important similarities between city and slum in the terms of access to income security (e.g., to insurance and grants). A key consideration is job search and job activity status. Since in practice earning an income is possible under both type of scheme (cash grants and—as surveyed above—unemployment insurance), the respondents were not restricted from working (and nor were obliged to work) by bureaucratic criteria. Both types of freedom, as indicated earlier, are important considerations in the assessment of the motivational impact of economic security.

There are also similarities between the surveys in the real coverage of income security. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the Renda Mínima (forerunner in São Paulo to the Bolsa Família) was at the time over four times more generous than the Bolsa Escola proposed then by the federal government (scheme unification was not yet achieved).⁷ It did not therefore suffer from the low levels of coverage of family needs that are, as discussed above, typical of many CCTs.⁸ In comparison, unemployment insurance for city dwellers starts at a maximum of 90% of the previous wage (the average over the period being 50%; ILO, 1999, pp. 297, 298). The length of coverage is a maximum of six and an average of four months, which is generous for a middle-income economy (Haagh, 2006, p. 399). In São Paulo therefore both UI and grants offered quite effective, medium-term, income security.

Brief mention must also be made of the nature of sample selection and possible problems of bias. First, an effect of random sampling is an equal gender distribution in the city and a marked female profile in slums. In the city, 49% of respondents are female, as compared with 87% in the slum. This derives from the fact that the cash grant is normally given to the female head. For this reason, and because gender is analytically relevant in our study, all figures and tables involving the slum either exclude males altogether or distinguish between females and males.

In respect on the other hand to biases that might impinge on work motivation we should highlight that such biases (e.g., as derive from being an active claimant) are typical of studies of public programme effects, given the low take-up of programmes of income supplement or insurance like these. In Britain (Atkinson, 1998, p. 108) and Germany (Riphahn, 2008) for instance, less than half of those who are eligible to claim income benefits actually do so.

In the case of the city survey, it is hard to dismiss the prospect entirely that the sample represents a higher than average job-search or indeed that this is driven by higher-than-average schooling. In respect to the first however it can be questioned how far individuals with middle-range schooling in São Paulo in general could afford to be unemployed long.⁹ It is even con-

ceivable that for some individuals visiting a job centre would indicate greater difficulty in finding a job than the norm, and that this effect to some extent cancels out any hypothesized (more than averagely active) job search effect.

As regards to the level of job search or schooling more generally, it is important to underline that both types of bias would pertain universally (to the sample in question). In fact a (universally) higher degree of personal initiative and of work motivation (such as may be derived from higher schooling, in the city) would conceivably lower the independent effect of economic security. In turn this would lead us to underestimate the de-motivating impact of high insecurity, an effect of which is then to render any associations that we do find between security and motivation to be highly robust. Conversely, in the case of the slum, where opportunity levels in general are very low, the fact of initiative to enrol would lead us to underestimate the effects of low opportunity and hence also raise the robustness of variations in incentive effects in respect to the city.

In turn, what specific differences in opportunity sets can we observe between city and slum, as derive from schooling and aspects of employment stability (e.g., unemployment and employment duration)? In regards to schooling, first, recently published figures on Brazil suggest a national average 6.28 years, and a city average (for São Paulo) of 7.5 years of in 2001 (Lorel, 2008, pp. 39, 53). In turn the latter conceals quite high inequalities (with a standard deviation for São Paulo of 4.58 years, Lorel, 2008, pp. 54). In this regard, and considering our two surveys’ spatial basis, we would expect profiles at the lower and intermediate to higher end of the city’s level of school inequality. Indeed, the mean of the slum-dweller survey was 4.07, which is the category of between 5 and 7 years of schooling (Table 1). The average schooling of the job-seeker constituency, on the other hand, is somewhere between 10 and 11 years of schooling, given a mean category of 6.44, with 6 being incomplete secondary (9–10 years) and 7 being the 11th year of school (complete or incomplete). Given that we expect schooling to be higher in settings with low marginality, it is not unreasonable to suppose, then, that this educational spread is well representative of central São Paulo. Note in this regard that in a large part of our analysis (below) we use a binary variable defined at the divide between years 9–10 and under and year 11 and over (with year 11 being the last year of secondary school). This makes analytically explicit the significance of what is generally accepted as a key educational threshold.

Turning next to employment stability, our results (Tables 1 and 2) are comparable to findings of the PME household survey (Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego) for urban Brazil, which found a fairly stable average of 24 months over time (Gonzaga, 2003). In the job-seeker survey, for instance, the average length of employment is only marginally longer, at 27.2 months (for the slum it is 26.7 months—Table 2). Meanwhile, for city dwellers with middle range schooling both employment and unemployment were, on average, fairly short and frequent (Table 2). In comparison, slum-dwellers were unemployed longer, averagely 28.5 months. This compares with 11.5 months in the city, and with 30 months for all of the 165,000 holders of grants (Pochman, 2002, p. 131).¹⁰

As we would expect, there are strong variations in the occupations pursued in city and slum (Table 1). In this table (and in our later analysis) work is ranked as having more occupational definition (OD) where it is thought to involve more organized scope for incremental learning, control over tasks and access to other (similar) jobs on the basis of acquired experience. Although control is thus more central to our definition

Table 2. *Duration of last employment and unemployment. Economically active persons only, %*

	Duration of last employment				Duration of last unemployment			
	City job seekers		Slum dwellers		City job seekers		Slum dwellers	
No. of observations	350		400		349		400	
Mean	27.2		26.7		11.5		28.5	
St. Deviation	38.5		38.5		14.8		41.2	
Months								
1-3	8		12		31		4	
4-7	20		15		23		6	
8-11 less t 1 year	7	35	10	37	15	69	4	
12-15	18		14		12		16	
16-20	9		9		3		17	
21-24 1-2 years	13	40	15	38	7	22	12	45
25-34 2-7 years		18		19		10		35
35-425 More t 7 years		7		6		-		6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 3. *Employment vulnerability and categories, %^a*

	Job-seekers				Slum dwellers			
	Insured	Uninsured	Insured	Uninsured	Grants	No Grants	Grants	No Grants
<i>T</i> -test (vulnerability by gender)	<i>T</i> .673 Sig. .502				<i>T</i> .602 Sig. .547			
Women	Men				Women			
Vulnerability	Vulnerability				Vulnerability			
mean 1.80	Mean 1.44				Mean 2.5			
St. deviation 5.8	St. deviation 4.1				St. deviation 4.16452			
St. error mean .446	St. error mean .311				St. error mean .22292			
<i>T</i> -test (vulnerability by insurance for women)	<i>T</i> -test (vulnerability by insurance for men)				<i>T</i> -test (vulnerability by grants for women)			
<i>T</i> -.982 Sig. .325	<i>T</i> .713 Sig. .477				<i>T</i> -.608 Sig. .546			
No. of observations	87	82	134	43	203	146	15	36
Mean	1.38	2.26	1.56	1.05	2.87	2.05	2.47	3.07
Low	34	28	35	23	13	20	-	6
Medium	38	44	46	61	35	37	40	42
High	28	28	19	16	52	43	60	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

^a Employment vulnerability is defined as the ratio of duration of unemployment to duration of employment. Therefore, the higher the value the higher is the vulnerability. Low is a ratio of 0.2 or less, medium a ratio of between 0.2001 and 1.3, and high is a ratio of more than 1.3.

than technical skills, the latter is undoubtedly conducive, as supposed by Sennett (above). In the job-seeker survey OD ranged from domestic services to trained professionals and office-based management, and in the slums from street-vending to skilled technician and nursery school teaching.

Finally, there are also notable differences between city and slum when we use an overall measure of vulnerability; defined as the ratio of the length of unemployment to length of employment—Table 3). Of particular note are the vulnerabilities affecting city women. For instance, not having insurance has a far greater detrimental impact on women's security. Overall women's vulnerability is higher than men's, whereas the reverse is true in the slum. This is then indicative of how the relatively more formal labour market (in the city as compared with the slum) tends to discriminate against women. Women in the city are better off than women in slums, but less so than in the case of men.

Prima facie, what differences, in turn, can we detect in job-search activity (as a measure of labour supply) as derive from these sources of economic security? In this regard we find, in line with earlier studies, that effects are stronger where oppor-

tunities are better; in the case of the slum, for instance, this is in the marginal district with greater city (and job) proximity (São Luís). This can be observed when, using odds analysis, we compare the two districts counterfactually (contrasting the relative likelihood of time spent looking for work) (Table 4). Overall however the impact of grants is insignificant as regards to job search activity (Table 4).

Looking at simple correlations, the only factors that did affect time for job search in a significant way in slums were conditions relating to employment status or persons. Specifically, the only variables that individually had a strong impact were age (youth—.001), schooling (higher—.019), gender (being male—.001), and employment length (being short—.011). For women only, these correlations were (youth—.001), schooling (higher—.114), and employment length (being short—.041). Neither motivation One or Two (as defined above) explained job search in a direct way, although the relation was positive (.389, .148 for both gender, and for women .722, .383). Motivation One however (for both gender and women) was strongly affected by schooling (.000, .000) short unemployment (.007, .019), formality (.000, .000) and longer

Table 4. *Slum: Time spent looking for work per day, Lajeado and São Luís, % & odds*

	São Luís			Lajeado			
	2 h<	>1 h	Odds	2 h<	>1 h	Odds	
No. of observations	156	44		145	55		
Grant—observations (percent)	34 (31%)	77 (69%)	0.44	21 (20%)	86 (80%)	0.24	
No grant—observations (percent)	21 (24%)	68 (76%)	0.31	23 (25%)	70 (75%)	0.33	
Total odds: that grant holders spend more time looking for work			1.42			0.73	
Final odds: that grants holders in Sao Luis spend more time looking for work				1.42/0.73=		1.95	
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.): Grant status as predictor of job search	.385			.268			
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square	1.674	Sig. .433				
District and grant status as predictors of job search (Sig.)		<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.
	1. District	.295	.233	1.607	.048	1.615	.204
	2. Grant	-.051	.234	.205	.827	.048	.827

Table 5. *City: what is the most important thing about a job? By schooling and employment length, %*

# (of observations)	Low schooling				High schooling				
	Short employment		Long employment		Short employment		Long employment		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
High income	4	6	1	1	13	10	5	5	
Stable income	41	70	15	22	54	43	31	32	
That it gets more interesting/challenging	14	24	51	74	53	42	58	60	
That you can work close to home	–	–	2	3	5	4	3	3	
Total # and percent	59	100	69	100	125	100	97	100	
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.) Employment length as predictor of work as interesting/challenging	34.479	Sig. .000		6.492	Sig. .011				
Independent samples <i>T</i> -test	<i>F</i> 18.851 Sig. .000 <i>T</i> –4.392 Sig. .000		<i>F</i> 21.297 Sig. .000 <i>T</i> –3.508 Sig. .001		<i>St. Er. Dif.</i> 6.28729 <i>St. Er. Dif.</i> 5.29166				
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample) schooling and employment length as predictors of work as interesting/challenging	Chi Square 36.996		Sig. .000	<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Square	Sig.
	Employment length	–.026	.006	21.014	.000	36.676	.000		
	Schooling	–.046	.070	.431	.512	.432	.511		

employment (.004 and .001—as binary variable). It seems then that both motivation and job search are in fact driven mainly by objective conditions, and, one can assume, less so, by traits of personality or individual preference.

In turn this appears to corroborate the limitations of gauging motivation through observed behaviour. As an example of this are European findings to the effect that better (more stable) jobs result from longer job search of those on more stable income support (Tatsiramos, 2009). In this case however we can only speculate as to the reasons for this (e.g., more repetitive search, more directed pressure from job centres, or actual enhanced motivation). By comparison, our surveys can get us nearer to the real motivational impact of income support. For instance, this can be observed in responses to a question, in the city survey, about the value of a hypothetical grant guarantee. Among those with insurance only a third (33%) thought the value of this to lie in the guarantee of itself. In comparison, nearly half (46%) of uninsured persons made a similar judgement. The insured in turn valued the guarantee as a springboard for job search. Compared with uninsured persons they were nineteen per cent more likely to identify more time to look for a better job as the primary gain.

An effect thus of looking in greater detail at work motivation itself is to bring us closer to the cause of the labour market effects

of more secure (especially longer and more generous) income support. The surveys are also valuable in allowing us to assess a variety of institutional factors in relation to work motivation. In the next section then we assess work motivation in relation both to different forms of economic security (in addition to income support) and in respect of more and less marginal groups. We consider first the more heterogeneous prism of the city survey and then compare with the slum.

5. CONTROL AND MOTIVATION IN CITY AND SLUM

(a) *Security sets and levels of motivation—the city*

Looking at attitudes to work in the city it is striking how little support we can find for the existence of a generic leisure-work trade-off, or even of size of pay as a primary goal. Time spent working (per week) was strongly correlated with occupational definition (.002) and with length of employment (.000), happiness in own occupation (.000) and occupational aspirations—wishing for jobs with more occupational content (.032) (according to the ranking in Table 1). On the other hand, when asked to consider “what constitutes the most important thing about your job” (motivation One), 55% said

“ever more interesting work.” Thirty-three percent mentioned “stable pay,” and seven per cent said “work near the community.” Only five percent mentioned “high pay” as a motive.

In Table 5 meanwhile these categories are considered in respect of the combined impact of level of schooling and of stable employment.¹¹ The table indicates that those in longer employment are more likely to see their job as a site of personal growth (Table 5). Conversely, they are less likely to value income level or stability for its own sake even with less education. The stability of employment is slightly more important to Motivation One for those of low education, as the Pearson Chi Squares suggest. On the other hand, when the stability of employment is taken as a continuous variable, as

shown in the *t*-test, the level of schooling does not make a significant difference. The low importance of schooling relative to employment stability is confirmed in the logistic regression (last row). The table then clearly indicates that when it comes to respondents’ own job (Motivation One), stability is more important to motivation than schooling.

On the other hand, those with less capability appear to strategize to acquire skills. Table 6 shows that training is valued most by those in unstable employment. This effect is stronger where schooling is low. Schooling now plays a strong, albeit still a less prominent, role (as appears in the logistic regression). This indicates, as we noted earlier, that the desire for capability is both an innate aspiration that is, as in this case,

Table 6. *City: what would be a better job for you? By schooling and employment length, %*

# (of observations)	Low schooling				High schooling			
	Short employment		Long employment		Short employment		Long employment	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
With more training	36	61	17	25	76	61	43	44
Closer to home	12	20	14	20	8	6	14	14
More interesting	—	—	—	—	5	4	5	5
Better paid	5	9	24	35	23	18	22	23
Where I can have an occupation	6	10	14	20	10	10	13	13
Total # and percent	59	100	69	100	125	100	97	100
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.) employment length as predictor of a preference for training	9.519	Sig. .002			1.175	Sig. .278		
Independent Samples <i>T</i> -test (Sig.)	<i>F</i> 18.851 (.000) <i>T</i> -4.392 (.000) St. Er. Dif. 6.28729				<i>F</i> 21.297 (.000) <i>T</i> -3.508 (.001) St. Er. Dif. 5.29166			
Multinomial Logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square 24.311		Sig. .000					
Schooling and employment length as predictors of a preference for training			<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.
	1. Employment length		-.015	.004	12.978	.000	17.993	.000
	2. Schooling		-.180	.070	6.572	.010	6.853	.009

Table 7. *City: what is the most important thing about a job? By insurance and employment length, %*

# of observations	Insured				Uninsured			
	Long employment		Short employment		Long employment		Short employment	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
That it gets more interesting/challenging	81	66	36	36	28	65	31	37
High income	5	4	7	7	1	2	10	12
Stable income	32	26	56	56	14	33	39	46
That you can work close to home	5	4	1	1	—	—	4	5
Total # and percent	123	100	100	100	43	100	84	100
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.) employment length as predictor of work as interesting/challenging	22.577	Sig. .000			7.790	Sig. .005		
Independent samples <i>T</i> -test (Sig.)	<i>F</i> 29.687 (.000) <i>T</i> -4.645 (.000) St. Er. Dif. 5.63521				<i>F</i> 6.609 (.011) <i>T</i> -2.555 (.001) St. Er. Dif. 4.86459			
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square 36.974		Sig. .000					
Insurance and employment length as predictors of work as interesting/challenging			<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.
	Employment length		-.027	.006	20.789	.000	35.950	.000
	Insurance		.047	.238	.039	.844	.039	.844

relatively independent of prior schooling; but it is also a desire that the institution of schooling develops.

The role that different layers of security play is more sharply brought into focus when we consider the influence of income support. For instance the idea that stable work is a primary source of Motivation One can be ascertained from comparing this effect with the effect of income support. Specifically, Table 7 shows that Motivation One depends on security in jobs rather than in income support. This can be read from the logistic regression. Overall insurance is not important, although it does make a minor difference for particular groups. Having insurance for instance reduces the chances that job instability leads to an emphasis on instrumental concerns such as high income or being closer to home.

Insurance, on the other hand, does appear to play a direct and dominant role in supporting intrinsic motivation of a

more general type. Here the likely explanation is that insurance enables the thought that occupation security can be expanded beyond the immediate job. This can be ascertained from Table 8, which looks at Motivation Two or intrinsic motivation in occupational life. The uninsured are twice as likely to prefer a stable job, whereas the insured are more likely to value occupational identify and personal growth.

But to what extent is the effect of insurance altered under alternative degrees of job uncertainty and levels of schooling? The associations in Table 9 are intended to help us look at this question. The logistic regression confirms that schooling is the stronger impact on work motivation (Two), although the other two sources are also significant (insurance especially). Lack of insurance for instance always reinforces the value of stable employment. In addition, long unemployment has a more pernicious effect on motivation where schooling is low.

Table 8. City: what is fulfilment in working life? By employment length and insurance status, %

# of observations	Short employment				Long employment				
	Insured		Uninsured		Insured		Uninsured		
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Developing personal capacities	47	47	31	37	69	56	19	4	
Identify with an activity/occupation for life	33	33	17	20	35	29	10	23	
A job that is stable & formal, professional & well-paid, or that one likes at the time	20	20	36	43	19	15	14	33	
Total # and percent	100	100	84	100	123	100	43	100	
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.) Insurance as predictor of work as personal development or occupation	11.265	Sig. .001			5.857	Sig. 0.16			
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square 20.142		Sig. .000						
Employment length and insurance as predictors of work as personal development or occupation			<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.	
			Employment length	.002	.004	.252	.616	.265	.607
			Insurance	1.094	.258	18.009	.000	18.303	.000

Table 9. City: what is fulfilment in working life? By schooling, unemployment length and insurance status, %

# of observations	Low schooling				High schooling			
	Short unemployment		Long Unemployment		Short unemployment		Long unemployment	
	Insured	Uninsured	Insured	Uninsured	Insured	Uninsured	Insured	Uninsured
# of observations	30	32	37	27	73	42	81	26
1. Job stability	27	56	27	56	10	19	15	35
2. Personal development	43	25	27	18	64	55	57	54
3 Occupational identity	30	19	46	26	26	26	28	11
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.) Insurance as predictor of personal development or occupation	5.565	Sig. .017	5.337	Sig. .020	2.103	Sig. .123	4.892	Sig. .031
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square 40.734		Sig. .000					
Schooling, unemployment length and insurance as predictors of work as personal development or occupation		<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.	
		1. Unemployment length	.026	.011	5.296	.021	6.412	.011
		2. Insurance	.988	.265	13.864	.000	13.937	.000
		3. Schooling	.319	.082	15.213	.000	15.870	.000

More specifically, then, Table 9 reveals that respondents are sensitive to variations in the way sources of security combine with each other. As discussed in Section 2, we can hypothesize that schooling itself has a dual motivational impact: Conceivably, it is both a source of aspirations (for learning) and of relative (labour market) security. On the other hand, the two types of effect are not necessarily tied to each other in practice: A disassociation exists in so far as uncertainty of jobs and of occupational life frustrate the aspirations generated by the educational aspects of schooling.

The table confirms that this is a significant risk: For instance, only a third of those with high schooling were both insured and experienced short unemployment. In a systemic sense this indicates then that although some individuals experience higher levels of security as compared with others, only few individuals' overall position is fairly secure (21 percent in the set). In turn, the upshot of this is that post-materialist aspirations and materialist (labour market) realities easily come into tension. The way individuals rationally order their strategic goals—for example, how they use materialist strategies in relation to post-materialist aims—is adjusted. Table 9 indicates that this may be so: For the highly educated, for instance, the incidence of both insurance and short unemployment strongly decreases the emphasis on employment stability. On the other hand, for those (with high education) without insurance and in long unemployment, the preference for job stability is higher than for respondents with *low* schooling, but who have insurance. In short, economic security beyond schooling appears to be needed to translate the aspirational impact of schooling. Where it is absent, the high-schooling effect is almost erased.

Note here that the nature of the associations in the tables, and their underlying condition, does not indicate an overriding role of preferences in driving the acquisition of stable jobs. Reasoning counter-factually, this presumably would require that those in unstable jobs prioritise personal goals over income or job stability, and that those in stable jobs prioritise job stability values, which we have found not to be true. As a tendency, the latter group somehow took the (actual) stability of their jobs or incomes for granted. The evidence then that confidence about occupation grows with extended forms of support (in addition to schooling), together with the finding that job stability supports motivation in jobs, appears to bear out the notion that instrumental motives form part of a sequence or strategy where enjoying work for itself is the superior goal. Only by looking at more parts of the sequence is this understood.

(b) Pathways of influence on occupational values—the city

But if attaining an overall sense of stability is in some sense a condition of developed preferences, what level of opportunity to attain this sense of stability do individuals have? What is the scope in other words for control in the form of some level of personal effort, such as might be indicated for instance where schooling has a strong impact on stability, irrespective of other conditions?

To shed light on these questions a broader informational set is required. This is needed to provide a better overview of how the sources of security that affect motivation are linked with each other—and with prior conditions. Below two basic approaches are followed. First we run a logistic regression to explain Motivation Two (Table 10), which includes a number of additional variables. Second we use path analysis, with a view to gaining more information about direct and indirect ways that key sources of security—and other factors—are linked and motivate work. We chose the binary form of Motivation Two (defined in Section 3) rather than Motivation One, because the former, as discussed, is indicative of occupational values in more general terms.

The regression ranked more years of schooling first, closely followed by being insured, and of less importance—but still of statistical significance, shorter unemployment and longer employment. Still less important, but also of statistical significance, is high occupational definition. As explained under the table, this is identified by distinguishing between two categories of low and high definition based on what can be presumed to be relatively less and more scope for learning, self-development and security in skills between jobs, as set out above (Section 4, further see Table 1).

The grouping here of occupations into two categories could be said to be rather crude, but an advantage is that this does possibly exaggerate the importance of occupational definition (the occupations in the low category likely being substantially less secure in the occupational sense, e.g., portering or domestic service as distinct from teaching or manufacturing). An upshot of this is that the variable should be highly significant if indeed lot or choice of occupation overrides other sources of economic security. The fact that occupational definition is important does bear out Inglehart's (reasonable) assumption that there is something qualitatively different in the post-materialist values (in our translation, self-orientated motivation) of those with more skills-defined occupations or/and autonomous styles of learning and working. However, the more significant influence of the other sources of economic security

Table 10. Logistic regression to explain a preference for personal development or occupation^{a,b}

Sample and variables	B	Standard error	Wald	Sig.
Whole sample Chi Square, 67.986, sig .000			9.173	.002
Age (older)	.575	.362	2.527	.112
Gender (female)	.541	.362	2.230	.135
Schooling (longer)	.452	.110	16.893	.000
Distance to city centre (short)	.045	.070	.412	.521
Occupation (more defined)	.012	.006	4.521	.033
Registers in (formal) work book (less to more)	.524	.409	1.635	.201
Insured (Insured)	1.546	.380	16.537	.000
Length of employment (longer)	.897	.394	5.195	.023
Length of unemployment (shorter)	.866	.367	5.833	.016

^a A linear regression was run to provide collinearity statistics. The lowest level of tolerance was 0.69, and the highest level of VIF was 1.4, both for the variable "distance." Levels of tolerance above .25 and VIFs below 4 are generally taken to be indicative of multi-collinearity problems.

^b More occupational definition is a dummy variable, with less including porter and security services, transport, domestic services, independent sales, rubbish collection, beautician, kitchen help, embroidery and shop assistance; and more including manufacturing, teaching, nursing, office-based positions, administrative assistance, telemarketing, and professions. Registers is number of formal jobs. Distance is time of travel from residence to the city centre.

lends overall more credence to the assumptions of the occupational model—also manifest in studies that in general emphasize control (above)—that economic stability, broadly defined, plays a foundational role in supporting self-driven motives to work.

Secondly, and bearing this out from a different angle, the regression also indicates that factors relating to innate or otherwise immutable characteristics of persons, are less important to self-driven motives than economic security. Being older, female, living closer to the city centre, and having had more formal jobs, are all positively correlated with self-driven motives. When controlling for other factors, however, these impacts are no longer significant.

But, if security more than personal characteristics shape motivation, what is the relation between the forms of security? Note here that several of the independent variables are correlated with each other (although, as noted under Table 10, not in a way that would significantly distort the regression results). These associations are interesting to explore for the purposes of identifying direct and indirect sources of influence on work motivation. For instance, how much of the effect of schooling is indirect, such as shaped by the influence that schooling exerts on other aspects of economic security? And, secondly, if gender, age or residence does not strongly affect motivation itself (in the city) do these factors nevertheless constrain the scope for attaining security? If so, and in so far as senses of control include a tangible relation between effort and outcome, we could hypothesize that this lack of real influence on obtaining—and retaining—security would itself undercut the prospects for self-driven motives to work.

Using a simple path analysis Diagram 1 sheds some light on these questions and problems. This follows a simple method whereby a series of multiple regressions are run with first motivation and then each of the key sources of economic security (and occupation) as dependent variables in turn. This follows the standard method for path analysis set out in Bryman and Cramer (2009, pp. 311–319).

As always with path analysis (Bryman & Cramer (2009, p. 312; Cramer, 2003/2009, p. 91; Loehlin, 2004, p. 9), it is important to note that the model can only show the strength of relationships, not the line of causality. Hence in the diagrams below variables are entered as independents only if a causal link can be reasonably assumed (as indicated by the direction of arrows). In turn, the arrows' relative thickness is an approximation of the relative significance (as indicated by the standardized regression co-efficient) of the factor concerned. The Beta statistic is then used to calculate the level of significance of the probable direct and indirect pathways of influence running from one originator variable to work motivation. This is done by first multiplying the Beta values in each indirect path (as entered under the table), and then summing the total, including in this the value of the originator variable's direct effect. Note that for visual ease all the pathways among and from the key sources of security (schooling, insurance, and unemployment and employment length) are entered in black (arrows), whereas prior conditions that (we hypothesize) affect these variables are entered in blue. Some relationships of weak statistical significance are shown, where relevant, but if not significant at a *p* value below .05 are not included in the calculation of paths (under the table).¹² Finally, note that the value for "other" include all influences not explained by the regression or model in question (defined by Bryman and Cramer (2009, p. 313), as square root of $1 - R^2$ of the equation). For example, the 0.77 for our regression for motivation indicates that the model explains 23% of this variable.¹³

Then, to proceed, it is immediately obvious from the thickness of the arrows that schooling has the strongest direct effect on work motivation (as we would expect). In addition, schooling has the overall highest direct and indirect effects, as we can see from the calculations under the table. Among the key sources of economic security, insurance status has the next most important overall effect, followed by employment length (at .260) and unemployment (.233, comprising only its direct effect).

Diagram 1 Path Diagram of Direct and Indirect Sources of Influence on Work Motivation




Diagram 1. Path diagram of direct and indirect sources of influence on work motivation (for methodology See Appendix A).

Table 11. *City and slum: what is the most important thing about a job? By sex and economic security, %*

Employment length:	Men				City women				Slum women				
	Insured		Uninsured		Insured		Uninsured		Grants		No grants		
	L	S	L	S	L	S	L	S	L	S	L	S	
L = Long: 16 months <. S = Short: >15 months													
# of observations	(73)	(59)	(14)	(25)	(45)	(40)	(27)	(55)	(111)	(92)	(71)	(75)	
That it gets more interesting/challenging	71	34	71	48	64	40	59	34	41	33	44	35	
High income, stable income or close to home	29	66	29	52	36	60	41	66	59	67	56	65	
Total 100%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
Pearson Chi Squares (Sig.)	18.344	.000	2.003	.157	5.079	.024	4.521	.033	1.676	.244	1.240	.265	
Employment length as predictor of work as interesting/challenging													
Independent samples T-test (Sig.)	<i>F</i> 34.426	(.000)	<i>F</i> 7.367	(.010)	<i>F</i> 1.192	(.278)	<i>F</i> 4.865	(.030)	<i>F</i> 12.366	(.001)	<i>F</i> 4.052	(.048)	
Multinomial logistic regression	<i>t</i> -4.337	(.000)	<i>t</i> -1.890	(.067)	<i>t</i> -1.869	(.065)	<i>t</i> -2.08	(.040)	<i>t</i> 1.427	(.157)	<i>t</i> 1.065	(.288)	
Gender and employment length as predictors work as interesting/challenging													
	Chi Square 28.335		Sig. .000		Chi Square 10.337		Sig. .006		Chi Square 4.942		Sig. .060		
	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig.	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig.	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig.	
	1. Employment length	-.034	.009	13.178	.000	-.018	.008	5.944	.015	.008	.004	2.938	.087
	2. Insurance	.436	.385	1.285	.257	-.240	.326	.545	.460	.472	.303	2.433	.119
	3. Grants												
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)													
Gender and employment length as predictor of work as interesting/challenging													
	Chi Square 37.211	(.000)						<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.
	1. Sex												
	2. Employment length												
	3. Insurance												

Table 12. *City and slum: what is fulfilment in working life? By sex, employment length and income support, %*

Employment: L = long, S = short L: 16 months<, S: >15 months	Men				City women				Slum women			
	L employment		S employment		L employment		S employment		L employment		S employment	
Insurance/grants: Y: yes. N: No.	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
# of observations	76	14	60	29	47	27	40	55	109	71	91	75
1. A professional activity that pays well/A stable and formal activity	16	14	20	41	2	33	15	34	21	14	22	16
2. A job one likes at the time	6	7	3	10	2	8	0	4	40	39	33	43
3. Developing capacities/ occupation	78	79	77	48	96	59	85	62	39	47	45	41
Total 100%	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Pearson Chi Squares City: Response 3 over 1	.018	.893	5.704	.017	15.315	.000	5.041	.025	1.815	.403	1.929	.381
	Slum: response 1 over 2 and 3.				Chi Sq. 21.038 (.000)				Chi Sq. 2.425 (.297)			
Multinomial logistic regression (sample split by gender). (Sig.)	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig	<i>B</i>	St. Er	Wald	Sig
1. Employment length	572	.389	2.170	.141	506	.439	1.327	.249	-.001	.004	.091	.763
2. Insurance	-.789	.411	3.651	.056	-1.754	.465	14.194	.000				
3. Grants									.433	.288	2.240	.134
Multinomial logistic regression (whole sample)	Chi Square 25.546	Sig. .000	<i>B</i>	St. Error	Wald	Sig.	Chi Sq.	Sig.				
1. Sex			-.456	.294	2.449	.118	2.489	.115				
2. Employment length			.540	.290	3.459	.063	3.532	.060				
3. Insurance			-1.231	.294	17.481	.000	18.014	.000				

Table 13. Mean no. of own children. By sex, marginality, income support and age of respondents

Grants (child-grant/other-no grant)	Slum male			City			Slum female			City		
	Total	Child G	Other/No	Total	Insured	Not in.	Total	Child G	Other/No	Total	Insured	Not in.
Total mean	1.35	2.14	0.8	.84	.93	.55	2.33	2.53	1.8	.65	.65	.65
# of observations	51	21	30	178	136	42	349	254	95	168	88	80
St. deviation	1.23	1.24	1.06	1.026	1.059	.861	1.42	1.26	1.48	1.164	1.155	1.181
Range of # of children	0-5	0-5	0-4	0-4	0-4	0-2	0-7	0-7	0-7	0-6	0-6	0-5
Respondent age: >25	.23	-	.25	.26	.38	-	1.68	2.25	.71	.11	.18	.08
# of observations	13	1	12	54	37	-	38	24	14	65	17	48
St. deviation	.60	-	.621	.556	.639	-	1.38	1.22	1.07	.400	.393	.404
Range of # of children	0-2	-	0-2	0-2	0-2	-	0-4	0-4	0-3	0-2	0-1	0-2
Respondent age: 26-34	2.0	2.25	1.0	.77	.77	.77	2.79	2.83	2.57	.75	.50	1.33
# of observations	5	4	1	60	47	13	111	92	19	60	42	18
St. deviation	1.0	.957	1	.945	.960	.927	1.42	1.47	1.17	1.244	.862	1.749
Range of # of children	1-3	1-3	1	0-3	0-3	0-2	0-7	0-7	0-4	0-5	0-3	0-5
Respondent age: >35	1.69	2.25	1.17	1.41	1.45	1.20	2.2	2.38	1.8	1.33	1.14	1.71
# of observations	33	16	17	61	51	10	200	138	62	43	29	14
St. deviation	1.31	1.24	1.18	1.41	1.154	1.033	1.25	1.07	1.51	1.426	1.597	.914
Range of # of children	0-5	1-5	0-4	0-4	0-4	0-2	0-7	0-6	0-7	0-6	0-6	0-3

Notably, schooling does not strongly affect the stability of employment or unemployment. This is interesting in light of the existing evidence of the weak income returns to (additional) mid-range education in Brazil (Neri, Kakwani, Son, 2007, p. 15), also mentioned above. This then begs the question as to the other factors that affect employment stability, as well as insurance.

These questions are explored through paths that originate in conditions that can be assumed to be prior, the coefficients for which are therefore calculated through regressions that take each of the key sources of security as dependent variables in turn (as explained). In the Diagram these appear visually as little clusters of influence pointing to each of the key sources of security, with arrows in blue.

Looking first at variables that might enter into explaining length of employment, we can see that spatial marginality (distance) has the overall most important effect.¹⁴ Age meanwhile is also a significant factor. Notably, age has two different and parallel effects on work motivation *via* employment stability. Younger people have more schooling which has an impact (albeit quite weak) on employment stability. But older people generally tend to have longer employment. Something similar occurs with insurance status: We can see that older people are more likely to be insured, but younger people are more likely to have higher schooling which strongly affects insurance status.

The effect, potential and real, of occupation, is interesting. As already noted, the way we have defined occupation should exaggerate its impact on security as well as on motivation (following Inglehart). In fact, none of the indicators in the diagram explain occupation itself in any significant way, indicating that either personal choice or other factors explain occupation (not residence, gender, schooling, or age) in the case of the city.¹⁵ More surprisingly, occupation also does not account for individuals' access to positions of economic security, in the case of the city, except *via* a slight impact on employment stability.

Overall then what stands out is the weak control individuals have over attaining security. In relation to employment stability for instance, this includes the weak role of schooling and choice of occupation, and the strong role of immutable factors like distance and age.¹⁶ Also of note is the significant role of other factors not in the regression, where we would expect schooling in particular to exert a much greater role. As an extension of this, it is noteworthy that when it comes to explaining insurance status, schooling plays a strong direct

role, but not (as one might expect) an indirect role *via* the length of employment. The length of employment, and its impact on insurance, is explained by something else not related to the incentives that may be otherwise associated with the acquisition of schooling. Among this "something else" distance is shown to be central. The upshot of this it seems is that the incentives to, and (employment stability) returns from, a few added years of school where these are most needed, among more marginal groups, and around the completion of secondary school, are comparably weak. Moreover, although there is no gender dimension to motivation itself, women are far less likely than men to be insured, and hence to be in positions where motivation might be sustained.

Overall the diagram points to the likely strong effect of secular changes, principal among them the inter-generational growth in years of schooling on self-driven motives to work (and of course this supports Inglehart's general hypothesis). Schooling however has relative to this quite a weak impact on the sources of economic security that, in the individual case, seem to be pivotal in sustaining the motivational impact of schooling later in life (e.g. employment stability). One positive indication is that gender in urban Brazil appears to play no role in school attainment. The fact however that the possibility of insecurity is much greater for women (through longer unemployment and less likelihood of insurance) indicates not only that the labour market strongly discriminates against women, but that women will find it much harder to sustain intrinsic motivation in occupational life.

(c) *Levels of opportunity, security sets and work motivation—the city and slum*

But what happens when a more pronounced opportunity gap is at stake? As discussed, slum-dwellers' level of opportunity was significantly lower as a consequence of the interacting effect of lower ranges of schooling, lower incomes and distance to jobs (and other services, Tables 1, A1, A2). Of particular interest is the combined effect of security sets and overall levels of opportunity on women, who are also likely to face a stronger conflict between the familial and occupational realms. As indicated earlier, we report (below) only the results of the slum-dweller survey for women (unless otherwise indicated) given the relatively small incidence in the sample of men (overall 51). This means that the main line of comparison below is between women in the city and slum.

Note here that the specific conditions for a leisure-work trade-off are different (in theory) between city and slum (in ways that are essentially similar for women and men). In the city, a leisure-work trade-off would, in neo-classical theory, be induced by the existence of more opportunities (allowing UI beneficiaries to pursue leisure for longer). The main attraction to work would be higher pay. Above we found both to be false. In the slum, meanwhile, the LWTO would, conversely, in theory, be induced by low opportunities (in particular pay, but also available—short-term—jobs, if we follow Ravallion's (2003) line of reasoning): Accordingly, individuals receiving income support would be strongly discouraged from working, perhaps especially women. A neo-conservative model would make a similar prediction, and emphasize cultures which reinforce instrumental values concerned with security. Finally, the incentive assumption would by contrast predict a stronger incentive in slums, in this case in light for instance of the greater relative boost to expenses relating to work (transport, in-puts, and so on).

The survey indicates a scenario that is more compatible with the occupational and some tenets of the standard and neo-conservative models, all of which emphasize the effect of weak exposure to work. The preference in slums for stability was indeed of a different order as compared with the city. Looking at women only, 84% in the slums, and only 44% in the city, rated the guarantee value of grants as their most important effect (notably there was little variation—one percentage point—between women and men in slums). In the slums only 11% of women compared with 32% in the city mentioned time to look for work as the primary benefit. Note here that there are more differences between females and males in the city, where only 31% of males mentioned the guarantee value first. Possibly this is because women in the city feel the gender differential pressure of the formal labour market more so than women in slums, for which there is some evidence (below). On the other hand, this means that the idea cannot be supported that poorer women would choose leisure as a consequence of their gender (their preference for familial security), which is an offshoot of the neo-conservative interpretation of the leisure-work trade-off. In short, the greater emphasis on instrumental aspects of security, in slums, is likely to be an effect of other, more general, aspects of low opportunity.

Despite this greater instrumental emphasis, however, there is evidence of incentive effects in slums, albeit the levels are lower. In addition, combinations of security are very important. Looking at Motivation One, for instance, and comparing the positions of women (Table 11) we can see that income security has a relatively stronger effect in the slums (logistic regression). This effect on its own however is still insignificant. Only when grants are combined with stable employment can a strong incentive effect be observed.¹⁷ This bears out, then, the limitation of both the incentive and disincentive assumptions where these prioritize the impact of income security. The leisure-work trade-off cannot be supported. On the other hand, the neo-conservative model accounts only partially for the stronger combined effect of employment and grants in the slum. It would predict a negative incentive from grants, but would typically associate this with cultures of poverty which reinforce laziness. The occupational model is stronger because it incorporates the effect of weak opportunities which is shown, in this table, to be a significant inter-acting effect.

The importance of spatially-determined opportunity contexts grows when we consider institutional determinants of views (Motivation Two) about working life as a whole. In Table 12 we can see that slum dwellers are much more likely than city respondents to assess work by its short-term appeal.

Where women in unstable employment have grants their aspirations however shift slightly (but significantly) away from short-term and towards occupational goals. Notably, this supports Ravallion's assumption (2003) that poor people would be more adverse to take short-term jobs if given income support. However we could not say that this is evidence of a leisure work-trade-off, unless we were to equate intrinsic or occupational motives to work with leisure (as non-work), which would be a contradiction in terms. The significant point is that we can still find a link between stability and occupational values in slums, albeit this is of a different (less developed) order, as compared with the city. So, whereas external security reinforces a valuation of personal growth through work in the city, in slums grants reinforce a preference for a stable profession and/or a well-paid job (although the effect is weaker). Nevertheless, on the whole, one can conclude that weak opportunity contexts play a very strong role in (relatively) de-motivating women in slums as compared with the city.¹⁸

In this context what is the significance of the realm of personal security and family life given the shorter fertility life-cycle of women? Presumably, a greater probability of insecurity on the labour market for women would increase the potential trade-off between the realms of (paid) occupation and (unpaid) care as potential sources of personal control. Recall that there was a greater probability (especially among city job seekers) that women would face longer unemployment and shorter jobs (compared with men—Table 3). This reveals the much greater challenges women face in translating better opportunities (for education) into forms of control. Indeed, city women, with higher schooling and better access to jobs, are in some respects relatively more insecure (as compared with men) than women in slums. The multiple constraints on women then may explain why women without insurance were by far the most likely to value income support for its intrinsic value, as an income guarantee, at 52% compared with only 28% of men with insurance. Notably, these results are not explained by general value differences between women and men. Table 12 confirms that gender has a weak motivating effect on its own (logistic regression); however that sources of security, and especially combinations of sources of security, have very different effects for each gender. Insured women were far more likely than both men and uninsured women (especially the latter) to see professional development as entailing “having an occupation” or “the development of capacities.” Moreover, when asked what a better job would mean to them, uninsured women were most likely to say one with better training, at 54% of respondents, compared, for example, with 40% for uninsured men.

The importance of multiple sources of economic security to women's occupational and family choices can also be seen in the lower fertility of insured women compared with uninsured women (over 26), and again with the fertility of women living in slums (Table 13).¹⁹ In fact, insured women's fertility was even lower than that of comparable males. This then, again, points to the greater trade-offs between work and family life that these women confront. On the other hand it is also an indicator that where women are in a position to do so, they tend to choose occupational goals, even where the barriers are high.

The degree to which and for what basic security acts as an incentive then depends on other forms of opportunity and security, as brought out clearly in the position of women. Women are slightly more likely than men to favour intrinsic motives to work (Diagram 1). However, women are less likely to attain positions where sustaining this motivation is possible. In this regard, women's position is important not only for

what it represents for women, but for what it shows about the importance of institutions for translating human capacity for motivation in general.

6. CONCLUSION

What is then the relevance of this for welfare analysis? I will suggest that it lies in the importance of a multi-institutional prism in the context of a more permissive view of the human potential for self-driven motives, or the Aristotelian principle. The basis for this conclusion derives from our use of a multi-factorial method in regards to both the forms and the sources of work motivation. This allowed us to move beyond the dominant theories in the welfare debate in so far as their analyses extended to predict either strong disincentive or incentive effects of one source of security, income support.

For instance, the standard or neo-classical as well as the (very similar) neo-conservative models could be shown to rightly predict stronger disincentives to work in poorer communities. However the reasons for disincentive effects were found not to lie in a preference for leisure—or in the receipt of income support, but in the absence of a stable framework of opportunity to support self-driven motives to work. The LWTO assumption is therefore wrong not only as a universal statement, but also in its depiction of causality between institutions and values: if a leisure-work trade-off pertained it was not because individuals (always) value leisure, but because institutions tended to suppress their potential for valuing work.

On the other hand, the incentive approach was found to be right in so far as income security was shown to have a generally positive impact on work motivation. However this effect is not very strong on its own, and hence it is easy to overdraw its capacity to support self-driven motives to work. The occupational model by contrast sets out by assuming a potential for self-driven motives, but draws out the sequence through which these are strategically expressed and institutionally bolstered. Here in turn there are significant overlaps with Inglehart's theory concerning the material bases of post-materialist values.

For instance, our findings support in a general way Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis (Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart et al., 2001), holding that persons will seek material security where it is absent. In addition, Inglehart's socialisation hypothesis, which holds that values change slowly and homogeneously, finds general support in the inter-group variation between city and slum. However the fact that most individuals even in a highly fragmented society hold (some) post-materialist values which in turn they display in highly individual ways, depending on their (spatial) level of opportunity and their security set, indicates that the modern condition is both highly dynamic and heterogeneous. In respect to individual strategies, it was found not only that stability is a source of support for agency (as self-driven motives), but that agency is also involved in seeking stability. There are limits however to what individuals in isolation can do to create good institutions.

More specifically, our analysis showed that obtaining several sources of economic security, in other words, gaining access to a sustained sense of stability, was in many ways accidental (both in city and slum): post-materialist values and materialist strategies were not supported in society in the form of an institutionally coherent shift. In São Paulo city, schooling and employment stability were found to be weakly tied; and—for individuals—to be linked to different levels of motivation, the first being general, and the second, particular (to jobs). It follows that the motivation that is anchored in real experience may not be able to bear out in practice the general aspirations that are developed through schooling.

The implication for policy is to support proposals that seek to universalise and integrate the access to core sources of economic security. Examples of relevant elements include Levy's (2008, p. 275) idea to develop more stable forms of basic income security in addition to expanding opportunities for more workers to supplement this foundation with contributory schemes. On the other hand more stable and occupation-based employment appears to be the key to derive motivational returns from both schooling and income support. Since high returns to schooling in Latin America have been strongly driven by scarcity, rising attainment will (as observed for developed economies, Esping-Anderson, 2004) be likely to demand more diversified initiatives in terms of employment. Inequality in other dimensions of schooling, for example by resourcing (including public and private) and spatial marginality, will be ongoing determinants of inequalities in schooling returns, as observed in this study in the form of access to jobs. All of this then suggest that forecasts of employment returns to CCTs should be cautious, as indicated by Levy *et al.* (2008, pp. 24–50, 134–136, 209–211, 226–227, 230, 253) in the absence of more plan-oriented employment policies (Medeiros, 2008, p. 17; Delamonica & Mehrotra 2006) in particular at lower and intermediate levels of skill.

The key point is that individuals cannot easily attain—through their own efforts—the level of control or developed preferences, that is, the individual responsibility and morality, that the current welfare model supposes. This being the case, it is unhelpful to make the acquisition of control itself a matter of desert or effort, whether by radically reducing income support to enhance motivation, or by stressing the low motivation of those with least opportunities as a justification for this. The occupational model suggests that individuals are motivated at the prospect of attaining control, a motivation that grows in turn with the level of security or actual control acquired. It follows that a more realistic policy is one that seeks to develop and re-connect the sources of security that make for stable opportunities in individual experience. In so far as experience is the active ingredient in the link between public and private values, one can assume that ease of access to forms of economic control is also tied to the wider legitimacy and efficacy of institutions, both public and private.

NOTES

1. The largest Brazilian scheme, Bolsa Família, covered about 11.1 million families in 2006 (Cardoso, 2007, p. 37; Medeiros *et al.*, 2008, p. 8).

2. Whereas the resources difference (in the ratio of students to teaching staff) between the public and private sectors in South Korea is nil, in Chile, Mexico, and Brazil students only have 63%, 66% and 58% of the teacher

resources of fee-paying students (author calculations, based on OECD, 2007, p. 383).

3. Inglehart also notes that a person's sense of security is not just a reflection of affluence but may be influenced by other factors, including the nature of institutions of welfare (2000, p. 3).

4. For the slum-dweller survey collaboration was established with the labour department of the municipality, headed by Marcio Pochman, who facilitated access to public registers of CCT beneficiaries (actual and those means-tested but not yet receiving). The city job-seeker survey, on the other hand was carried out in cooperation with the publicly financed and regulated labour relocation centre, the largest of its kind in São Paulo, the Central de Trabalho e Renda (also dispensing unemployment insurance), which enabled random selection of job-seekers for survey. Pilots were conducted by the author and fielding and tabulation of the two surveys performed together with the independent professional survey institute Criterion. Criterion has expertise in the sampling and conduct of labour market and public policy surveys and had previously been contracted to run checks on the effects of the Municipality of São Paulo's cash grants programmes. Altogether the research entailed five funded field visits by the author to São Paulo over a two-year stretch.

5. In turn, the share of formal workers—by this definition—in our sample, was 77%, as compared with 77.3% for São Paulo within the category of salaried workers (Pochman, 2002, p. 39). Given the residential profile of the job-seeker survey, in an area of higher than average schooling (below), and therefore of more formal employment, this is broadly as we would expect.

6. Note that of the individuals sampled in slums, only 2 had once had access to unemployment insurance, and none had access at the time of the study. Of the individuals sampled in the city, none had had access to grants.

7. The average coverage of the SP programme was R\$117.16, as compared with the Federal Government's proposal of R\$27.4, of which the latter corresponds more closely to the national programme.

8. The municipal law stipulated a maximum of nearly one minimum salary (a maximum value of 33% of the difference between family income and three minimum salaries) (Pochman, 2002, p. 76).

9. That UI recipients should regard the formal labour market as insecure is plausible. The UI system is itself seen to reinforce a high rate of turnover amongst Brazilian economies. A well-known trend is of informal bargaining in relation to UI benefits whereby firms offer individuals "time out" by formally dismissing them in periods of downturn (and before severance payments accrue), which in turn allows workers a period of subsistence on (UI) benefits. Companies then sometimes rehire individuals formally or downgrade their contracts (Camargo, 1996).

10. Those working in formal secure jobs (over 12 months) worked an average of 7.4 h a day, whereas those working in informal insecure work, worked 4.6 h a day. Formal insecure and formal secure groups worked similar hours, at 6.3 and 6.2 h, respectively. Occupation was also an important determinant of work time. The average in occupations like beauty, security and street-vending was 4.5, 5, and 5.6 h, and child-care, manufacturing and transport 6.7, 8.4 and 8.5 h.

11. In all the tables to follow, key variables and terms are defined as follows: *Schooling* as a binary variable is defined in terms of low schooling as years 9 and 10 or below (37% of the sample), and high schooling as year 11 and above (63% of the sample). *Stable employment* is employment of 16 months or over (47% of the sample), unstable is 15 months or less (53% of the sample). *Insurance* status refers to unemployment insurance. *Short unemployment* is unemployment of up to and including 6 months (51% of the sample), and long unemployment any length over 6 months (49% of the sample). The *Pearson Chi Square* is taken of variables in their dichotomous form (as specified above and in each table). The *t-test* assesses the significance to views about work of the difference of means of

particular variables (in each table the subsidiary variable in table headings). The variable for which the mean is taken is entered in its continuous form (in Table 5, for instance, the length of employment). Where this variable cannot be entered in a continuous form a *t-test* is not performed. In the *multinomial logistic regressions* variables where possible are entered in their continuous form.

12. Beta values in bold indicate *p* values of .001 or .000.

13. The R^2 in this case is .392. Note that R^2 at or above .30 are usually taken to indicate a high level of explanatory power in research on human values or behaviours.

14. This is interesting in so far as it points to another dimension of labour market access that is largely beyond individuals' control. As noted earlier the commuting distance in the job-seeker sample is averagely about an hour and generally within a one-and-a-half hour range, which is not very long by metropolitan standards. From this then we can detect how important spatial marginality is in explaining the larger distances (discussed below) between city and slum.

15. Of course where the city constituency is compared with the slum (Table 1) it is clear that residence does affect occupation, specifically the likelihood of domestic service and other precarious occupations in terms of hours (see Foot note 9). We do not pursue this comparison directly here partly, as discussed above, because slightly less marked social divides (as in the city itself) better allow us to distinguish impacts relating to choice, personal attributes, economic security and other conditions.

16. The Pearson correlation between low and high schooling and short and long employment (as binary variable defined as in earlier tables) is positive, but only nearly statistically significant, at .066. Where both are taken as continuous variables, the correlation is even weaker (.771 within the city survey and .661 within the slum-dweller survey). Note here that if we compared city and slum, schooling would be observed to have a significant impact on work (for instance on length of unemployment—Table 1), given that slum-dwellers' access to labour markets are weak at the same time as their schooling is lower (as compared with the city). It is of special interest however to observe the effects of smaller differences in years of schooling (e.g., within city and slum rather than between the two). Both motivational and policy intervention impacts are likely—in the case of individuals and in the medium-term—to be associated with incremental rather than large changes in years at school. This being the case, it seems of particular relevance to observe whether small variations have employment and other effects.

17. In respect to the weaker effect of employment stability in slums, we should note that 86% of slum-dwellers who worked had unstable hours (this phenomenon was virtually non-existent for city-dwellers). Hence it is fair to assume that a first priority for slum-dwellers was regularity or formality, before employment stability. Notably, the formality of work was strongly associated with motivation 1 (.000).

18. In support of this, the evidence points to a much greater aspiration-opportunity gap in the slums. For example, 59% in the control group (in slums) believed they would be able to gain stable employment as a result of a grant, compared with only 21% of actual recipients.

19. Education played an important but not all-powerful role. City women over 35 with lower education had 2.3 children on average which varied very little by insurance status, whereas women with higher education had .93 children, but with uninsured women having twice the fertility rate, at 1.5 as against .71 for insured women.

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APPENDIX A. METHOD

Six multiple regressions were run (following Bryman and Cramer—henceforth BC—2009, pp. 311–317) to indicate direct and indirect pathways of effect on motivation as follows (see Diagram 1):

Dependent	Independents
1. Schooling	Distance, age, gender
2. Occupation	Schooling, gender, distance, age
3. Insurance	Schooling, employment, age, occupation, distance, gender
4. Employment	Schooling, unemployment, distance, gender, occupation, age. No. of formal jobs
5. Unemployment	Schooling, employment, insurance, occupation, gender, No. of formal jobs, distance, age
6. Motivation	Schooling, insurance, employment, No. of formal jobs, unemployment, distance, age, gender*

Arrows to motivation at the far right end of the diagram represent all the direct sources of influence controlled for all of the others, as measured by the standardised regression coefficient (or Beta value, as shown along individual arrows). All other arrows and their Beta values are established by way of the other regressions (Nos. 1–5), and used to calculate indirect paths (as done below). The thickness of arrows represents the approximate strength of particular relationships (or Beta

values). The impacts of the primary variables in our analysis (namely schooling, unemployment and employment length, and insurance status) are presented in bold (black) arrows, this being for visual ease. Other factors that directly explain motivation (e.g., from regression 6) are also entered in black. Variables that can reasonably be assumed to represent prior conditions to the access to the key sources of security are presented in blue. Relationships that are not statistically

significant but that have values of p between .05 and .200 are shown in brackets, but *not* included in the calculation of paths (below). The value “Other” in the diagram includes all influences not explained by the regression model in question (represented by punctuated blue arrows). For instance, the 0.77 for our regression (6) for motivation suggests that this model explains 23% of motivation (with an R^2 of .392, and calculated as square root of $1 - .392$, following BC, 2009, 314).

PATHWAYS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS on WORK MOTIVATION (TWO), where work is seen as a source of development of personal capacities or as occupation, as distinct from work being valued as a source of employment security (defined as either secure pay, job formality or job stability)

Direct and indirect influence of.more SCHOOLING:	.493
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.354). <i>Path 2:</i> Schooling → Employment → Insurance → Motivation (.155 × .206 × .286 = 0.009). <i>Path 3:</i> Schooling → Employment → Motivation (.155 × .202 = 0.031). <i>Path 4:</i> Schooling → Insurance → Motivation (.346 × .286 = 0.099). Total indirect effect: 0.009 + 0.031 + 0.099 = 0.139. Total direct and indirect effect: of schooling = .354 ± 0.139 = .493.	
Direct and indirect influence of.having INSURANCE:	.286
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.286). Total effect of insurance = .286.	
Direct and indirect influence of.YOUNGER AGE:	.266
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.179). <i>Path 2:</i> Age → Schooling → Motivation (.247 × .354 = 0.087). Total effect of younger age = .179 ± .087 = .266.	
Direct and indirect influence of.EMPLOYMENT LENGTH:	.260
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.202). <i>Path 2:</i> (Longer) employment → Insurance → Motivation (.202 × .286 = 0.058). Total effect of (longer) employment = .202 ± .058 = .260.	
Direct and indirect influence of.closer DISTANCE:	.239
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.134). <i>Path 2:</i> Distance → (shorter) unemployment → Motivation (.205 × .233 = 0.048). <i>Path 3:</i> Distance → (longer) employment → Motivation (.281 × .202 = 0.057). Total indirect effect: 0.048 + 0.057 = 0.105. Total direct and indirect effect of closer distance = .134 ± .105 = .239.	
Direct and indirect influence of.more OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITION:	.199
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.199). Total effect of occupational definition = .199.	
Direct and indirect influence of.being FEMALE:	.149
<i>Path 1:</i> Direct effect (.149). Total effect of being female = .149.	
Direct and indirect influence of.OLDER AGE:	.102
<i>Path 1:</i> Age → Employment → Motivation (.167 × .202 = 0.034). <i>Path 2:</i> Age → Insurance → Motivation (.240 × .286 = 0.068). Total effect of older age = .034 ± .068 = .102.	
Direct and indirect influence of.being MALE:	.066
<i>Path 1:</i> Being male → Insurance → Motivation (.231 × .286 = 0.066). Total effect of being male = .066.	


Table A.1. Independent sample T test for Insurance status, by women and men, Job-seeker survey

		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. error mean	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean diff.	Std. error	95% confidence interval Lower	Interval of the difference Upper
<i>Women</i>														
Age	Insured	88	31.81	8.159	.870	.143	.706	5.056	168	.000	6.221	1.230	3.792	8.650
	Uninsured	82	25.59	7.860	.868			5.063	167.810	.000	6.221	1.229	3.796	8.647
Schooling	Insured	88	6.99	1.394	.149	6.381	.012	3.326	168	.001	.794	.239	.323	1.264
	Uninsured	80	6.20	1.710	.189			3.302	156.484	.001	.794	.240	.319	1.268
# of registers (all)	Insured	88	3.23	2.462	.262	24.122	.000	7.403	168	.000	2.215	.299	1.624	2.806
	Uninsured	82	1.01	1.171	.129			7.571	126.338	.000	2.215	.293	1.636	2.794
# of registers (excl. those without)	Insured	82	3.46	2.384	.263	22.133	.000	4.058	123	.000	1.533	.378	.785	2.281
	Uninsured	43	1.93	.910	.139			5.151	115.129	.000	1.533	.298	.944	2.123
Length of last employment	Insured	87	28.5862	31.81215	3.41062	3.693	.056	1.974	167	.050	9.69596	4.91227	-.00219	19.39412
	Uninsured	82	18.8902	32.02546	3.53662			1.973	166.271	.050	9.69596	4.91325	-.00443	19.39636
Length of last unemployment	Insured	87	12.48	13.075	1.402	.665	.416	.487	167	.627	1.044	2.145	-3.190	5.278
	Uninsured	82	11.44	14.791	1.633			.485	161.660	.628	1.044	2.152	-3.207	5.294
Vulnerability	Insured	87	1.3784	2.97668	.31913	3.012	.084	-.986	167	.325	-.88081	.89292	-2.64367	.88205
	Uninsured	82	2.2593	7.74488	.85528			-.965	103.240	.337	-.88081	.91288	-2.69124	.92962
Distance	Insured	76	61.00	28.421	3.260	3.011	.085	-2.408	131	.017	-12.982	5.391	-23.647	-2.318
	Uninsured	57	73.98	33.651	4.457			-2.351	108.713	.021	-12.982	5.522	-23.928	-2.037
No of children	Insured	88	.65	1.155	.123	1.017	.315	-.013	166	.990	-.002	.180	-.358	.354
	Uninsured	80	.65	1.181	.132			-.013	163.716	.990	-.002	.181	-.359	.354
Occupational categories	Insured	63	3.4286	1.36446	.17191	.993	.321	2.432	113	.017	.65934	.27114	.12216	1.19653
	Uninsured	52	2.7692	1.54178	.21381			2.403	102.884	.018	.65934	.27434	.11524	1.20344
<i>Men</i>														
Age	Insured	136	32.57	9.076	.778	.438	.509	3.230	175	.001	5.054	1.564	1.966	8.142
	Uninsured	41	27.51	7.704	1.203			3.527	76.500	.001	5.054	1.433	2.200	7.908
Schooling	Insured	137	6.44	1.524	.130	3.743	.055	2.291	178	.023	.647	.282	.090	1.205
	Uninsured	43	5.79	1.884	.287			2.052	60.225	.045	.647	.315	.016	1.278
# of registers (all)	Insured	137	3.83	2.912	.249	.014	.906	3.190	178	.002	1.600	.501	.610	2.589
	Uninsured	43	2.23	2.724	.415			3.303	74.564	.001	1.600	.484	.635	2.564
# of registers in work book (excl those without)	Insured	123	4.27	2.752	.248	.485	.488	.154	144	.878	.094	.613	-1.118	1.307
	Uninsured	23	4.17	2.387	.498			.170	33.925	.866	.094	.556	-1.036	1.225
Length of last employment	Insured	136	34.9706	48.46864	4.15616	16.125	.000	2.567	177	.011	19.29617	7.51645	4.46277	34.12957
	Uninsured	43	15.6744	15.08661	2.30069			4.062	176.993	.000	19.29617	4.75045	9.92135	28.67098
Length of last unemployment	Insured	135	12.56	17.389	1.497	9.257	.003	1.995	176	.048	5.423	2.718	.059	10.788
	Uninsured	43	7.14	6.703	1.022			2.992	170.085	.003	5.423	1.812	1.846	9.001
Vulnerability	Insured	134	1.5685	4.61098	.39833	2.057	.153	.713	175	.477	.51931	.72787	-.91723	1.95584
	Uninsured	43	1.0492	2.12955	.32475			1.010	153.629	.314	.51931	.51394	-.49599	1.53460
Distance	Insured	119	64.13	24.366	2.234	.968	.327	-.157	156	.876	-.746	4.752	-10.133	8.641
	Uninsured	39	64.87	29.658	4.749			-.142	55.792	.888	-.746	5.248	-11.260	9.768
No. of children i	Insured	136	.93	1.059	.091	3.125	.079	2.112	176	.036	.379	.179	.025	.733
	Uninsured	42	.55	.861	.133			2.354	82.719	.021	.379	.161	.059	.699
Occupational categories	Insured	89	2.8652	1.29852	.13764	3.426	.067	.213	112	.832	.06517	.30577	-.54068	.67102
	Uninsured	25	2.8080	1.52753	.30551			.194	34.346	.847	.06517	.33508	-.61554	.74588

Table A.2. Independent sample T test for Grant status, by women and men, slum-dweller survey

		N	Mean	Std. deviation	Std. error mean	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean diff.	Std. error	95% Confidence interval Lower	Interval of the Difference Upper
<i>Women</i>														
Age	Grant	203	35.75	8.626	.605	5.075	.025	-2.157	347	.032	-2.210	1.025	-4.226	-.194
	No grant	146	37.96	10.478	.867			-2.090	274.062	.038	-2.210	1.058	-4.292	-.128
Schooling	Grant	203	4.06	1.696	.119	.262	.609	-.695	347	.487	-.126	.181	-.482	.230
	No grant	146	4.18	1.627	.135			-.700	319.933	.484	-.126	.188	-.479	.228
# of registers	Grant	203	1.48	1.477	.104	.248	.619	-1.032	347	.303	-.168	.163	-.488	.152
	No grant	146	1.65	1.529	.127			-1.026	305.949	.306	-.168	.164	-.490	.154
# of registers (excl. those without)	Grant	124	2.89	1.884	.169	.336	.563	.298	219	.766	.073	.244	-.408	.553
	No grant	97	2.81	1.685	.171			.302	215.032	.763	.073	.241	-.402	.547
Length of last employment	Grant	203	26.12	30.97	2.17	4.122	.043	-.598	347	.550	-2.4160	4.0417	-10.365	5.533
	No grant	146	28.53	44.53	3.69			-.565	242.376	.573	-2.4160	4.2790	-10.845	6.012
Length of last unemployment	Grant	203	30.46	40.43	2.83	2.005	.158	1.228	347	.220	4.8260	3.9304	-2.904	12.556
	No grant	146	25.64	29.35	2.43			1.292	346.966	.197	4.8260	3.7356	-2.521	12.173
Vulnerability	Grant	203	2.87	4.89	.343	5.648	.018	1.826	347	.069	.82236	.45040	-.063	1.708
	Not grant	146	2.05	2.80	.232			1.984	332.122	.048	.82236	.41454	.006	1.638
Distance	Grant	203	1.51	.501	.035	.611	.435	.857	347	.392	.047	.054	-.060	.153
	No grant	146	1.47	.501	.041			.857	312.730	.392	.047	.054	-.060	.153
No of children	Grant	203	2.3202	1.30154	.09135	8.381	.004	-.232	347	.817	-.03597	.15519	-.34119	.26925
	No grant	146	2.3562	1.59196	.13175			-.224	272.686	.823	-.03597	.16032	-.35159	.27966
Occupational categories	Grant	203	.9655	1.01659	.07135	2.402	.122	-.900	347	.369	-.10298	.11446	-.32810	.12215
	No grant	146	1.0685	1.10583	.09152			-.887	296.268	.376	-.10298	.11605	-.33136	.12540
<i>Men</i>														
Age	Grants	15	46.73	16.520	4.266	1.592	.213	1.814	49	.076	8.678	4.785	-.937	18.293
	Not grants	36	38.06	15.171	2.529			1.750	24.364	.093	8.678	4.959	-1.548	18.904
Schooling	Grants	15	3.93	1.438	.371	8.443	.005	-.984	49	.330	-.567	.576	-1.724	-.590
	Not grants	36	4.50	2.021	.337			-1.130	36.624	.266	-.567	.501	-1.583	-.449
# of registers (all)	Grants	15	4.40	2.414	.623	.841	.364	1.491	49	.142	1.206	.809	-.419	2.831
	Not grants	36	3.19	2.713	.452			1.565	29.359	.128	1.206	.770	-.369	2.780
# of registers (excl those without)	Grants	14	8.57	7.920	2.117	4.361	.043	1.340	39	.188	2.497	1.864	-1.273	6.268
	Not grants	27	6.07	4.085	.786			1.106	16.675	.284	2.497	2.258	-2.274	7.268
Length of last employment	Grants	15	30.27	53.018	13.689	4.874	.032	.826	49	.413	8.767	10.619	-12.573	30.1106
	Not grants	36	21.50	23.390	3.898			.616	16.320	.546	8.767	14.234	-21.359	38.892
Length of last unemployment	Grants	15	28.47	22.782	5.882	.088	.769	-.020	49	.984	-.172	8.740	-17.736	17.392
	Not grants	36	28.64	30.411	5.068			-.022	34.828	.982	-.172	7.765	-15.938	15.593
Vulnerability	Grants	15	2.47	2.660	.687	1.842	.181	-.608	49	.546	-.598	.985	-2.577	1.380
	Not grants	36	3.07	3.397	.566			-.672	33.320	.506	-.598	.890	-2.409	1.212
Distance	Grants	15	1.47	.516	.133	.272	.604	-.752	49	.456	-.117	.155	-.428	.195
	Not grants	36	1.58	.500	.083			-.742	25.516	.465	-.117	.157	-.440	.207
No of children	Grants	15	1.0000	.65465	.16903	11.849	.001	-1.333	49	.189	-.50000	.37510	.37510	.37510
	Not grants	36	1.5000	1.38358	.23060			-1.749	48.042	.087	-.50000	.28591	.28591	.28591
Occupational categories	Grants	15	2.5333	1.68466	.43498	.634	.430	1.197	49	.237	.58889	.49207	-.39995	1.57773
	Not grants	36	1.9444	1.56651	.26109			1.161	24.626	.257	.58889	.50732	-.45676	1.63454

Table A.3.1. Map of the 50 districts of the municipality of São Paulo



Red-shaded areas: Districts chosen for random sampling (Jardim São Luis in the South and Lajeado to the East). Pink-shaded areas: Districts identified by the municipal government of Marta Suplicy in 2001 as areas of low human development and priority zones for the roll-out of the Conditional Transfer Scheme of the municipality 2001–04. Of these, the 10 areas of highest priority (encircled in black) are identified as Anhanguera, Brasilândia, Capão Redondo, Cidade Tirandentes, Graja, Iguatami Jardim Ângela, Lajeado, Marilac, Parelheiros, Sacomã, Sao Lucas, and Vila Prudente). *Source: Pochman (2002, pp. 32, 48), basic map, p. 25. Colouring and zones based on p. 48 and (Red zones), author's survey.*

Table A.3.2. Three ways of mapping poor regions of the municipality of São Paulo, Brazil, 2002

