

Basic income, social democracy and control over time

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Basic income is commonly seen as a key contributor to raising our control over time. Basic income analysis, however, has tended to oversimplify this impact by focusing too exclusively on the agency aspect of freedom and on one institution – the basic income reform. In response, this article applies a multi-institutional and developmental lens to the problem of control over time. The multi-institutional framework of social insurance in social democracies is shown to reduce inequalities of access to more forms of stability and, on this basis, to constitute a preferred welfare state context for a basic income reform.

Introduction

In this article I discuss complementarities between basic income and social democracy and reasons why these have been neglected before. The prospect of raising our control over time can be argued to be a key feature of the case both for basic income and for social democracy, here defined as a system of coordinated investment in human development. Both seek to raise our control over time for leisure. Basic income relieves us of the need to earn, and social democracy devises social investment and institutions in ways that better allows us to have control over time within the sphere of legally regulated, or formal, production.

Nevertheless, basic income analysis often tends to portray the relation between basic income and social democracy as laden with conflict. Below it is argued that this tension can be illuminated, and to some extent, overcome by the adoption of both a systemic perspective on institutions and a developmental lens on control over time.

The systemic perspective looks at patterns of interaction between institutions and therefore offers a broader framework than the focus on basic income alone. Meanwhile the developmental conception of time leads us to focus on the human life cycle, which is important for control over time properly to be considered an aspect of freedom. It allows us for instance to divide control over time into different dimensions. This is useful as a vehicle for comparing the ability of different economies to enhance more dimensions of control at once, affording us thereby a measure of overall control of time or developmental freedom, in different states. This approach may not be comprehensive, but it is more robust than a measure of just a single dimension of control over time.

The result is a clearer perspective on the real trade-offs associated with the basic income under different systems of welfare. A limitation of basic income analysis is precisely that by focusing on only one institution, it has tended to see the wider economy as broadly de-institutionalised through a Walrasian or neoclassical perspective, and a singular concern, in this context, with the aspect of time that the basic income most directly affects, namely our access to leisure. From this in turn

Key words: social democracy • social insurance • libertarianism • basic income • decommodification

Final submission October 2010 • Acceptance October 2010

follows a tendency to over-extrapolate our capacity to control other dimensions of time through our control over leisure.

A systemic and multidimensional prism takes us beyond these limitations by indicating how systemic aspects of the relation between institutions affect more dimensions of time as taken together. This done, it becomes clearer why basic income, all considered, is likely to have a greater impact on control over time if set in a systemic context of social democracy. The basic reason is that social democracy offers a more realistic platform for abating forces that systemically constrain our control over time. Social democracy therefore is also a more plausible basis for a new politics of de-commodification, including such as might comprise a basic income reform.

The text below proceeds in the following way. The first section sets out a developmental and systemic framework as a basis for offering reasons why the welfare system of social democracy is comparably more conducive to control over time. The second section then considers the bases of the tension often perceived to exist in basic income analysis between basic income and social democracy and some ways to address it. These can be summarised in the need to properly acknowledge the systemic conditions – key among them progressive forms of public finance – that allow for more socially equal distributions of overall control over time. The third section considers these systemic conditions empirically. The fourth section concludes.

Systemic aspects of social democracy and control over time

The developmental conception of control over time

To understand the importance of a systemic approach, it is relevant to first identify basic areas of human activity around which it may be plausible to argue that all individuals have an interest in having control. To this end, I will use a developmental model that relates control over time to the human life cycle, hereby distinguishing between three central human activities and two dimensions of control (in this relying on Haagh, 2007). The three central activities are working, leisure and care; the two dimensions of control I call dynamic and static. Dynamic control entails the ability to have some control over activities in the long run like developing a career. Static control, on the other hand, relates to our ability to control more activities at once.

In this article the problem of dynamic control will be considered in connection with paid occupation. Static control, on the other hand, will be related to the ability to combine time for paid occupation with leisure and care. It can be argued that control of time within paid occupation is only one – and on its own perhaps a limited – form of control. However, I want to suggest that this reference point is useful in that it connects the realm of formal production with control of time for other (non-formal) activities. It thus avoids what I argue to be a tendency in basic income analysis to under-conceptualise the systemic aspects of the economy, and, hence, over-extrapolate about the scope for controlling our relation with formal production.

In sum, a key advantage of the approach adopted here is that it helps us to frame the comparison of welfare systems and it considers dimensions of control both within and outside of formal production. For instance, you might say that where persons can develop their paid careers with regular time for other essential things

(like leisure and care), they have a higher level of developmental freedom or overall control over time.

In this context, the systemic institutional approach is helpful because it can enlighten us to practical ways in which composite forms of freedom are politically constrained. First, the institutional approach in general recognises the importance to individual autonomy of material security and of predictable property rights and rules (North, 2005: 14–15; Acemoglu et al, 2001, 2002: 1235, 1262; Nugent and Robinson, 2001: 1262–3, 1273). A key aspect of this is to recognise that the market itself is composed of institutions and property rights, and therefore that all market economies have systemic (patterned) outcomes that arise from the way institutions are structured (Chang and Evans, 2005: 100–09; Evans, 2007: 37). Since, then, all market economies are coordinated in some way, it is false to assume that individuals are ever entirely free from social pressures or rules. The real question is how consciously coordination is used with an eye on raising the most important aspects of individual control by removing uncertainty, and doing so not just for the few.

Systemic institutionalism and social democracy

The institutional approach then allows us to observe the effects of the tendency in social democracy to redistribute security and standardise time through regulatory tools, flanked, as I show below, by a dominant role of public finance. In general this happens through efforts to democratise work, care and welfare/leisure, including the time and finance for these, as guided by a principle of social insurance. Social insurance and its twin idea, solidarity, represent more encompassing egalitarian principles than equal shares, of which the basic income – like citizens' pensions or child grants – is a typical case. The commitment to coordination and distribution that follows from solidarity shapes the way social democracy may both enrich the content of, and also equalise opportunities for, human development in connection with as well as outside of production.

Two aspects of this commitment to coordination are of particular importance to control over time. The first concerns the legitimacy of unequal resourcing for specified hardships. This dimension of social insurance supports dynamic control of time by enabling economic stability beyond what the basic income alone could achieve. A case in point is the way the public subsidy of unemployment insurance and new occupations can support the stability of income streams and careers – even if this can entail more resources for some. Social insurance also supports control of time in the static dimension, including through the way subsidised childcare enables combinations of (paid) occupation and care. Notably, these aspects of the stabilisation of competitive pressures formed the centre of Esping–Andersen's (1990: 48–54; 2002: 6–16) depiction of social democracy. The point is that everyone benefits by an increased sense of security, irrespective of how much – over the course of a life – each person receives.

Basic income supporters rightly point out that a right to help in specified events (as opposed to unconditional rights to a basic income) opens the door to checks by the social authorities that can undermine (some aspects of) individual autonomy. However, combinations of basic income with social insurance not only reduce this risk but arguably present a richer source of protection of freedom – as both

security and autonomy – than either social insurance or basic income might pull off on their own.

A second source of support of control via the risk-pooling principle of social insurance occurs through the transparency and stability of expectations generated by standards. Where the state incentivises forms of tenure – typically through public employment and indirectly its influence on private bargaining – individuals gain dynamic control (the opportunity for employment stability). Something similar occurs with control of work hours – further considered below.

Post-productivist and libertarian critiques of social democracy

Still, we should ask, does the above emphasis on production not overly downplay the importance of individuals' control over time outside of production? Post-productivist critics of social democracy (among them basic income supporters) can (rightly) point to a recommodifying trend in Nordic – as in other – economies, for instance in the cutting of the time before income claimants face pressures to work (Haagh, 2001: 404). And yet, it is not clear that the link between development path and the organising of production is entirely inflexible or fixed over time. What is distinct about social democracy is the collective organising of resources and time with a view to the equitable advancement of human development. The specific form that this takes is responsive to exogenous changes in the economic environment: It seems overly demanding, for instance, to suppose that social democracies – typically small economies that are dependent on trade – can escape global pressures that destabilise production and entail more state involvement in the management of work and development. Likewise, social democracies – like other economies – face the need to manage rising health and welfare expenditures in the context of scarce resources and of the need to create social rules for production. More to the point, these conditions do not obviously detract from the deeper tendency and capacity of social democracy to strengthen autonomy through collective resources (Haagh, 2001: 406–7). One can envisage less productivist uses of public funds for training and democratised work. In Scandinavia, the component of means-tested benefits remains very low (3% and 2.8% in Denmark and Sweden respectively as against 15.4% and 24.3% of the total in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland; Eurostat, 2010). Notably, civic associations are engaged in debates about the direction of training expenditures (Norgaard and Pallesen, 2003). And, in their structure of family benefits as well as in their treatment of unemployed people, the Scandinavian economies are still noticeably less commodified, as I discuss further below.

There is still the question, however, of whether coordination per se is not limiting of individual control in some important way, even if standards collectively raise the sense of security. The important part of the libertarian objection is whether the state may not, by using coordination, come to have too much power over what individuals will do, for instance in which activities their time is employed.

Here, however, we need to consider that a tendency towards the systemic reduction of labour time – typical of social democracies – seems to have a lot in common with the intention to reduce external time pressures on individuals that accompanies the basic income proposal. Publicly financed early retirement in Nordic countries represents an indication of this overlapping intent, even if, as observed,

social democracies have tightened pressures on especially younger cohorts of the population to enter employment.

In addition, when considering the libertarian objection to time coordination it is important to distinguish between kinds of activities and the content of same. So – the fact that individuals are enabled to have more time for leisure or to combine paid work with care, through regulation, does not specify what work people will do or how they divide their time between leisure and care.

In fact, as social democracies tend to socialise (high) human development standards, there is a tendency for more diverse opportunities for different structured work to arise. This is an effect of the more even quality of education and how this impinges on a lower concentration of formal skills in select individuals. This lower concentration, for instance, generates more even income and employment returns to education, and more investment – public and private – in diverse opportunities, including apprenticeships, as I show later on. Coordination, then, in this case, generates a broader range of quality choices. In so doing it also enriches the quality of the choice to work or not to work that individuals would have under a basic income reform.

So, the institutionalist's answer, again, to the question as to whether individuals are not better off without coordination, is that we cannot escape systemic forces and the *de facto* existence of rules that coordinate exchange. The real choice that societies face is what set of rules to adopt and in doing so deciding which freedoms it is most important to value. A good example of what is at stake in terms of trading some aspects of absolute autonomy or control of time for other – arguably more fundamental – sources of control, through collective means, is the regulation of (formal) work time – an aspect of our static control, highlighted above.


This regulation restricts a person's full autonomy by disallowing those who wish to do so to hold formal jobs in which they may be paid for working more hours than defined by the law. As an aside, the key objection raised, namely a person's ability to earn, either by effort or talent, could be resolved by either doing two jobs or by the ability to command a higher wage – as the return to a higher level of skill. Key aspects, then, of the full autonomy lost could be regained – doing two jobs, or commanding more pay, but through voluntary means – without subjection to a permanent high workload as a condition of holding a job (one job can be shed). More importantly, the exercise of some people's full autonomy (to do two jobs) cannot under work-time rules ensue in a competitive drive whereby working this hard becomes everyone else's condition of being employed. The unusual or unlikely choice – doing two jobs – will not affect others.

What we can observe, then, is what appears to be a general tendency within some economies – understood here as more social democratic (than others) – towards the expression of solidarity principles across institutions. In turn, this points to the second sense in which the systemic institutional tradition is relevant, namely where it asks us to consider how more institutions interact and what underlying conditions might explain interaction (Acemoglu et al, 2002: 1262–3; Hall and Soskice, 2001: 17). What I want to suggest is that a more progressive and high level of tax is an important underlying source of support of solidarity principles. The general – or systemic – importance of public finance for decommodification was clearly perceived by T.H. Marshall when he advocated balancing the quality of public and private goods (with the exception of 'frills') (1992 [1950]: 34; Haagh, 2002: 9–11,

2002: 9–11). Progressive taxation supports this balance by lowering the inequality of income while simultaneously increasing the state’s capacity (via public finance) to democratise aspects of work, welfare and time. Importantly, these areas of public finance are key features of both Esping–Andersen’s (1990: 27–8) and Rothstein’s (1998: 146–49) characterisations of social democracy. It matters, however, for what purposes public spending is used. In social democracies the commitment to social insurance and solidarity explains both the existence of high and progressive taxation, and the purposeful use of these funds to strengthen the social insurance commitment.

Graph 1 serves to illustrate how the Scandinavian economies have both high and progressive taxation (y axis) and a high commitment (x axis) to social insurance and solidarity principles in their structure of spending.¹ The x axis privileges spending items that support and equalise individuals’ capabilities in relation to production (education and training) and its combination with other activities (family life – through childcare). These measures then point to decommodification within production.

Graph 1: Public finance for human development



Notes: X: composite index of public expenditure in GDP in 2005 on: (1) education (*20) ; + (2) income support, pensions, social services and health (*1); + (3) training and job creation *100; + (4) childcare (*100). Sources: elaborated from OECD (2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b).

Y: composite index of: (1) upper marginal tax rate (marginal personal income tax and social security contribution rates for average single person without dependants at multiple of 167% of the average wage; (2) 167% multiple as % of 67% multiple – to indicate progressiveness of tax (/10); and (3) total tax revenue as % of GDP.

Sources: Elaborated from OECD (2007c, 2008b).

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Education typically constitutes between a third and a quarter of the value of social spending, whereas training/job creation and childcare can be as little as a 100th or less of social spending (eg for the United States [US]) (see Table A.1). Yet, because, as argued, this spending is highly indicative of public commitment to solidarity principles, I have multiplied the last two items by a factor of 100, and education by a factor of 20.²

Overall, the figure shows a broad tendency – with some outliers such as Italy and Spain – towards a relation between the structure of tax and spending that counteracts systemic pressures from markets. Countries such as Belgium and France are closest to the Scandinavian group, although the latter remains distinct by the level at which solidarity within production – in combination with other activities – is privileged through education and childcare.

In summary, there is much to suggest that social insurance as a practised principle provides room for policies that are akin to basic income along certain dimensions. Both social democracy and the basic income reform entail commitments to advance individuals' control of time through decommodification. The basic income does this more fully in respect to the right to (a basic) independent income, but social democracy adds to this through ways that participation in production is made less market dependent and unreliable than the case in liberal states. Therefore, seeing the basic income as in conjunction with social democracy is preferable to seeing basic income as a standalone institution. The last position, in giving primacy to rights outside of production, renders the ways the basic income can contribute to control over time less visible, as I examine below. Not only this, there is a strong tendency in basic income analysis to reject core features of social democracy, which compromises the discovery of important complementary impacts of basic income and social insurance. With a view to better understand and resolve this problem, the next section considers the character of the rejection in basic income analysis of the systemic perspective on time and of social democracy.

Basic income analysis and the procedural primacy of our control over leisure

Why is there a tension between the basic income defence and social democracy, and how could this be reduced? To answer this question it is important to understand that the basic income defence has not, in general, been framed within a systemic perspective. It has proceeded instead by defending the institution of basic income on individual terms. In doing that, it has prioritised the aspect of freedom that basic income most directly advances, namely the freedom to leisure without fear of a loss of subsistence. In short, the focus on one institution – and one source of freedom – has undermined the relevance of basic income to questions of welfare reform that go beyond leisure.

This approach has tended in turn to support an overemphasis on libertarian arguments within basic income debates. One type of overemphasis concerns the feasibility of using leisure to constitute other freedoms, principally in respect of exercising control of paid occupation and care. Another example concerns the feasibility or desirability of doing so in a Walrasian market economy that is relatively free from state intervention.

Van Parijs's real libertarian defence of basic income

A general idea of what is entailed as adjustments to basic income analysis can be illustrated with reference to Van Parijs's (1995) influential discussion of the market in jobs. The organisation of the job market is important because, through taxation on income, and measures to stabilise occupation and subsidise childcare, it systemically affects our overall control over time, as I show later on.

Van Parijs (1995: 122) wants the highest level of basic income to be paid that is compatible with the productivity drive. The two basic institutions in his analysis therefore are basic income and the market economy. The point to make here is that Van Parijs's analysis broadly follows a Walrasian or market-rational account where the market is organised primarily to raise the productivity drive. The result, as I will argue shortly, is to in fact underrate key institutional aspects of time control, and leave underspecified the systemic conditions that affect our use of leisure in relation to other activities.

Note first that Van Parijs (1995: 117–8, 120–1) formalises the basic income defence by identifying socially assisted leisure as compensation to those unable to earn and attain social positions (given that jobs are scarce). In doing so he neglects the extent to and ways in which job scarcity varies: the role of public investment in social employment, for instance, is known to shape the number and sharing of jobs. This is one area in which social-democratic states, as mentioned, tend to expand individuals' access to dynamic control, through support of employment.

Van Parijs is also in danger of devaluing occupational stability and its institutional support. He observes that 'jobs do not stick to people the way talents do ... [and hence] jobholders [must] pay the full price of the assets [in jobs] they appropriate' (1995: 121).

The supposition here – that jobs do not stick to people like talents do – seemingly overlooks (a) the extent to which jobs help to develop long-term skills, talents and opportunities, and (b) the possibility that individuals may value this dynamic sense of control over time. In his analysis, individuals face constant pressures to choose between market employment and leisure. According to Van Parijs (1995: 121), 'it is up to [jobholders] to divest themselves of [their] jobs once the price of keeping them is such that they envy the jobless just as they can and should give up under analogous circumstances a piece of land which they are not that keen to work on'.

The problem is that this analysis seems to overestimate individuals' real control of mobility in an uncertain (Walrasian) job market where concerns of sustained and high productivity are primary. In this market, individuals may be free to leave, but not necessarily to stay in, jobs. The basic income cannot then realistically be defended as a compensation for the loss of social positions, which would require specification of the sorts of institutions that would uphold individuals' right to jobs.

Equal freedom of jobholders and others

Greater specification of the state's role in upholding individuals' interests in jobs also would help solve a potential inequality between jobholders and other recipients of basic income in respect to the dynamic control over time. Under a basic income reform, the ability of those who leisure to engage in self-organised occupations

would entail that this group is more secure in their life plans. They have in theory more 'dynamic' control of occupational life. To make the status of jobholders more equal in this sense would therefore require a modification of Van Parijs's market-rational account of jobs, for example through making schemes of social insurance and property rights available for holders of jobs. This of course can never be perfect but, as we show below, the more coordinated social democratic (Scandinavian) economy tends to be better at generalising occupational rights.

Individuals' access to balanced time between occupation, leisure and care depends, in addition, on public regulation and resources being used to protect combinations of all three activities. This regulation is necessary to get us away from a position where the activities of occupation, leisure and care are treated simply as matters of individual choice within the market economy.

In turn, this takes us back to the question of the possible trade of primary goods in respect to social positions and leisure. Van Parijs (1995: 92–6) is concerned to stress that a basic income scheme is able to accommodate the lifestyles of both lazies and crazies. This fits with the market-rationalist account of jobs in so far as crazies, once they shift their preferences, can change their lifestyle (eg 'once they envy the jobless'; 1995: 121). This approach, however, risks making individuals bear the full cost of adapting to market forces, notwithstanding how this may affect their long-term ability to exercise control over time. The idea that individuals may give up jobs 'once they envy the jobless' suggests that they might have to give up jobs in order to leisure or care.

Equalising the status of care work would, then, have to involve, besides the basic income, either defined benefits for carers, and other measures to support carers' future occupational choice and/or, as Elgarte (2008: 6) also argues, subsidised childcare and a general reduction in work. The latter would be necessary to insure against a trade-off between occupation and care. In this respect, it does not matter whether socialised care is provided in cash or kind. Universal reductions in work time are also required because they are the only means to ensure that formal work is systemically devalued relative to other activities (Alesina et al, 2005), and thus becomes a real choice for all.³

Basic income and progressive taxation

A final and important area where Van Parijs's analysis of the job market appears to be in conflict with social democracy relates to taxation. His assumptions appear to lead him to defend or tolerate regressive taxation as well as high inequality (2004: 22; 1995: 122), both of which are in tension with social democracy. He also uses the difference principle in a way that hypothetically allows for unlimited inequalities of income and wealth (1995: 125). Consider, however, that if the rates of compensation and of tax only partially account for people's work motivations (Haagh, 2011), then high inequality may be more damaging than Van Parijs imagines. Given that Van Parijs himself thinks that personality is decisive in individual preferences (to be lazy or crazy), and indeed basic income analysts generally emphasise intrinsic motives to work, there are good reasons to attenuate the neoclassical account both for intrinsic reasons and because of how it relates to taxation.

As argued earlier, and as shown in the next section, there are grounds for thinking that higher levels of access to coordinated time for all will depend on high and progressive taxation. A high level of social insurance has been argued by Rothstein (1998: 154) to be a key motivating factor for citizens' support of high and progressive taxation in social democracies. By the same token, the high level of access to balanced time for all that progressive public finance permits, also works to modify individuals' (work) motivations in respect to earnings and tax: high and progressive taxation, on the one hand, inherently limits the size of (final) pay as a motivating source of compensation for work; but, on the other hand, it raises the motivating compensation that is attached to control. It does this by systemically permitting access to coordinated forms of time for all through social support for universal welfare and for democratised work. In the penultimate section I turn to illustrate some ways that this argument finds empirical support in cross-country comparisons.

Control over time in the OECD

A comparative review of economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides some evidence of systemic consequences of the progressive public finance of human development – or social democracy – for control over time. As illustration, I survey how the regulatory outcomes of institutions have systemic impacts on the dynamic and static dimensions of time.


Public finance and occupation equality

First, public finance in education, as argued, plays a key role in extending occupational opportunities and therefore individuals' control of a key dynamic aspect of time. In this respect, what really matters, as observed before, is the relative quality of public and private provision (what I call 'the Marshallian balance', Graph 2, x axis). A recognised effect of inequality of education is to concentrate well-paid and secure employment in a smaller group of (highly skilled) persons (Pagano, 1991). In contrast, the existence of more structured opportunities for formal employment allows individuals to choose different kinds of (paid) employment with greater security: both the range and the quality of (formal) occupational choice are enhanced.

To consider this institutional complementarity, we need in addition to the index of education equality, an index of occupation equality (Graph 2, y axis). This index comprises five indicators of equality of access to and of returns from work (from the OECD). The first three pertain to the evenness of access to and returns from work by level of schooling. They are as follows:

- the lower secondary education employment rate;
- the employment rate at this level of schooling as a ratio of the rate attained by those with higher (tertiary) education;
- a relative measure by the same levels of education, but of income returns.

We assume here that those of lesser formal schooling also have some, if different, occupational skills. We can say, then, that the integration of this group into employment and a relatively higher ability to command income from this, would

Graph 2: Equality of schooling and employment returns

Notes: X: Overall private/public schooling resources inequality: composite index of: (1) population that has attained at least upper secondary education; + (2) % of students in state-financed schools (wholly or part state-financed); + (3) spending on education that is public; + (4) ratio of teacher to pupil in state over private schools (lower secondary), to a maximum of 100 (equality with public sector). Sources: (1) and (4): elaborated from OECD (2006); (2) and (3) elaborated from OECD (2008a).

Y: Level, equality and quality of employment integration: composite index of: (1) lower secondary education employment rate, females; + (2) lower secondary employment rate as % of tertiary education employment rate, females; + (3) lower secondary income return rate relative to tertiary income return rate, females; + (4) distance of highest fifth of earnings to median (expressed as * 2 and subtracted from 200 to make the figure run from high to lower wage dispersion), both genders; + (5) female unemployment rate.

Source: All elaborated from OECD (2008a)

be indicative of a more even spread of control over the dynamic form of control over time.

In addition, and to capture the ability of the labour market to accommodate groups with particular constraints, the above indicators are taken for women. This is also the case for the fourth measure, which is the rate of unemployment (inversely – subtracted from 100, to keep the overall index running from low to high integration). Women face a biologically driven choice earlier in life between care and career and therefore face higher barriers to balanced time. Hence, both the unemployment rate and the differences between women of less and high education are likely to reflect a trade-off between these lines of activity – not just for women, but for all – unless somehow prevented.

Finally, and fifthly, to make the composite variable more robust as a general measure of occupation equality, I include also an overall indicator (for both genders) of wage dispersion. Graph 2 accordingly presents a view of the relation between education equality and this composite variable for occupation equality (for the index, see Table A.3).

The figure indicates that there are high complementarities in general between institutions, both within each index (see Tables A2 and A.3) as well as between them. In short, systemic complementarities appear to exist between the ratio of public provision in education and occupation equality. Therefore, higher spending can be shown to lower education inequalities and generate higher occupation equality, a result of which is to reduce casualisation and raise the level of control over time for more individuals.

Social democracy and employment transitions

Another relevant measure of dynamic control of occupation concerns the sorts of services individuals are given at critical junctures in their lives, e.g. the employment transition. An employment transition is typically conceived as one of movement into unemployment or a move from one job to another. But it can also be understood as a re-entry into work of individuals who have been absent for long. That is why institutions that govern employment transitions are crucial means of reducing status inequalities between workers and non-workers, as earlier observed.

The key point that I want to make is that institutions that regulate employment transitions also tend to be more inclusive where inclusivity is high in the institutions of occupation and schooling. In other words, there is a self-reinforcing mutuality between the levels of integration in these institutions. For instance, the replacement rate of unemployment insurance is more generous in the countries with more equal schooling and more equal employment returns (Table A.4).

As a rule, then, where countries make high social commitments to individuals' life plans, they do so at the same time for those who work and for those who do not. This indicates that it is unlikely that there will be sustained political support for a basic income where there is not also support for the life plans of earners.

The same point comes across when we look at the public structure of employment transitions. Many scholars suggest that social-democratic states exercise relatively more compulsion to work over the unemployed (Groot and van der Veen, 2000: 17–18; 2003: 9; Goodin, 2001: 36); and contrast this with the freedom-enhancing effect of a basic income reform (Groot and van der Veen, 2000: 18). However, when we look at the structure of spending and entitlement, we find that states that give less emphasis to employment, for example Holland, are not obviously less punitive in their management of unemployed people.

Graph 3, for instance, indicates that there is a link across countries between a high emphasis on the finance for income support and training and a low emphasis on the simple state administration of individual behaviour (see also columns 2 and 3 in Table A.4).


Notably, despite the fact that the UK spends 13 times less than Denmark on income support and 12 times less on training, the UK spends five times more than Denmark on the administration of benefits and recipient behaviour (0.21% of gross domestic product [GDP] as against only 0.04% of GDP in Denmark). Holland also tends more towards a spending on checks than on training.

Weak spending on real occupation in Britain arguably has left a tighter monitoring of behaviour as the best available regulatory tool. According to the OECD (OECD, 2007a: 223), 'For job seekers reporting requirements seem to be most rigid in the

UK, where they need to list details of every application at each fortnightly signing'. On the other hand, it is not evident, as Goodin (2001: 36) contends, that 'no [other] country provides, at one and the same time, both more money to non-earning households and less pressure to participate in active labour market programmes [than Holland]'

Graph 3: Support and control in employment transitions

Benefit administration (percentage spending in GDP)



Notes: X: % of GDP spent on public benefit administration, 2005.

Y: Training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, start-up incentives, spending in GDP, 2005.

Source: Elaborated from OECD (2007a)

Indeed, according to the OECD, the contracted-out model of job placement in Holland, based on targets given to private providers, involves a process of relatively more intense control over individuals than in countries like Sweden and Denmark (OECD, 2007a: 215). The targets include a 'prevention quota' of 20% of the unemployed, to be allocated to jobs within eight days, that is, even before registration begins and unemployment becomes 'regular' (OECD, 2007a: 214–5). In Holland, a compulsory personal action plan is designed after a month, as compared with nine months in Denmark. Individuals report every three months, as compared with one month in Holland and two weeks in the UK (OECD, 2007a: 227).

In summary, the examples given show, then, that a high level of public spending on employment transitions does not automatically entail more control by the state. In the context of an overall social insurance emphasis, public finance is more likely to perform a constitutive role in relation to individual freedom. Although not as

long as under a (prospective) basic income reform, individuals have more time in Scandinavian countries than in liberal states before facing direct pressures to work.

Developmental freedom as overall control over time

But what, then, about the static dimension of control over time? Are there complementarities also between the sets of institutions that affect dynamic control and institutions that regulate opportunities for balanced time between occupation, leisure and care?

If we consider only overall leisure hours on their own, the evidence is not very clear. What we find is that average overall leisure is higher in the non-Nordic countries, which had a relatively lower (but still high) level of public finance (Table A.5, column 1). This supports the view advanced by Goodin (2001: 33–34) and others (Goodin and van der Veen, 2003: 6–9) that Holland is the leading post-productivist economy because it has more leisure hours on average. Furthermore and as an aspect of this, Holland has a high share of (well-regulated) part-time work. This, it is indicated, supports ‘temporal autonomy’ (‘the capacity for people to arrange their affairs as they please – that comes with part-time ... work’ (Goodin, 2001: 25). In addition, it supports women’s freedom to care (Goodin, 2001: 27). This is, then, somewhat similar to the argument that a basic income helps support carers by removing their dependence on earnings.

A problem, however, from our perspective, is that the above approach does not take into account the overall distribution of leisure, and nor therefore the freedom of access of all to balanced time. This is evident in the way that the above manner of looking at things assumes that the opportunity to care relies on ending careers. Part-timers (usually women) are put at a competitive disadvantage in occupational terms. In other words, this aspect of the post-productivist debate, like the basic income debate, discussed earlier, presents an either/or-ness in respect to time for paid work and care that needs to be overcome and addressed.

In turn, one way to exemplify this is to imagine that the democratisation of time, especially as concerns gender equality, is far more likely where the position of women, through education and occupation, has become sufficiently equal that the finance of care has been socialised. In addition, and as part of this process, part-time work would no longer typically be a woman’s condition, but rather a gender-free choice.

In fact, when we look at the participation of men in part-time work among the more egalitarian welfare systems (with more progressive taxation and greater public spending on education, family policies and training; Table A.1), the Scandinavian economies stand apart from the rest. We can see that only the Scandinavian economies with the highest levels of public finance for human development have a high relative male participation in part-time work (Table A.5, column 5).


In turn, we can hypothesise that a reason for this is that in Scandinavia universal work-time reduction, not part-time work, is the predominant means of lowering work time. In Denmark, part-time work constitutes only 18% of the total compared with 36% in Holland. Other contributory factors to a more equal gender division in Scandinavia are higher support for income and training in employment transitions, and higher socialised support for care (as shown above). In contrast, a more equal gender division in the US and Poland, could be related partly to the way part-

time work is casualised, making it less of a choice and more of a necessity for both women and men.

We need, then, for a fuller picture, to incorporate in a composite measure of control over time, indicators about occupation that would reflect the non-casualisation of work. Moreover, to do that in a way that more completely illustrates balanced time in both the static and dynamic dimensions, it is useful to also include the social protection of care *with* career, over a critical period. Recall that many feminists who support basic income do consider it important that care and occupation are effectively combined (Elgarte, 2008; Zelleke, 2008: 6). Consequently, I also include in the composite index of control over time (in addition to overall leisure and the gendered dimension of part-time work) the total period of paid parental leave (for women plus men). And, finally, as a way to illustrate low casualisation, I use the relative occupational integration of women, as shown in Graph 2. The relative occupational integration of women can be seen, as already discussed, as a general representation of the democratisation of work. Graph 4, then, finally, relates the welfare system, as measured before, to this index of overall control over time.⁴

We can see that the extensiveness of the principle of social insurance across institutions (social democracy) appears to maximise a state where overall work time is both reduced *and* redistributed. In other words, the welfare system that tends to emerge from social democracy is also – it appears – one that is more likely to protect our property rights in, and our overall control over, time.

Graph 4: Control over time and the welfare system



Notes: X: as above.

Y: composite index of: (1) average annual leisure hours(/100); + (2) share of males' part-time employment that is part-time as a percentage of the share of females' employment that is part-time; + (3) combined numbers of months of paid maternity and paternity leave, and the Y score of Figure 3 /10.

Source: Elaborated from OECD (2007a, 2007b, 2007c)

Conclusion

What are, then, the implications of these observations for our analysis of basic income and welfare states? Consider first that control of time is valued in basic income analysis. It is assumed that the freedom the basic income gives us to withdraw – wholly or partially (through part-time work) – from formal production allows us to control our relation with occupation and care. But basic income analysis places excessive weight on the basic income as the foundation for our overall control over leisure, occupation and care. By adopting a systemic perspective we were able to indicate how the structure of public finance, by shaping complementarities between institutions, affects our freedom across all three activities in both the static and dynamic dimensions of time. The particular structure of public finance we associated with social democracy offered generally a higher order of developmental freedom as balanced control.

There are some broader both analytical and reform implications. On an analytical level, it is possible to draw out complementarities in their contribution to freedom of basic income and social democracy. The former would protect the freedom of some to do more of one kind of activity. The latter would protect everyone else's freedom to choose to do all activities without trade-offs between one and the others.

What in turn would be required for the real libertarian defence of basic income reform? Recall that both Van Parijs and many others in effect argue that control over leisure is a kind of negative freedom – from our need to labour – that supports our, ultimately more important, positive freedom. I argued that this libertarian approach limits our conceptions of paid work, social participation and productivity.

As a response, we need to consider the important role of high and progressive taxation and of social spending on a variety of elements of human development. Recall that a progressive system of tax is important because it helps to stall the rise of inequalities in access to stable and meaningful occupation, which are hard to reverse. Here we encounter the crux of the tension between the defence of social insurance and the anti-systemic position in basic income analysis, in so far as the latter, as argued, tends to take the market itself as a neutral background to distributive schemes. As an example of this, van der Veen and Van Parijs (2006) argue that we should accept the low feasibility within the global economy of 'stable positions' in the Rawlsian sense. The implication of this statement is that stability within a market economy is not attainable, or – if it is – we should resign to the rise of inequalities within the sphere of production and use the basic income to resolve the need for stability.

From the institutional perspective adopted here, this position is not realistic because there is a politics of the market economy that involves a constant struggle for positions of stability by agents and institutions. We can either choose to make this politics explicit and coordinate our access to stability or we can let inequalities in this area arise with the result that the effect that a BI can have on our freedom to choose will be limited to the sphere outside of formal production. In other words, the key point here is that we cannot simply ignore the phenomenon of stable positions. Market economies thrive on stable positions, from the very existence of firms and banks to the role (for individuals) of education and training. The relevant question is how far access to stable positions – in occupation, income, welfare and coordinated time – can, and should, be democratised.

This democratisation – we argued – would help to remove a possible negative consequence of a basic income in a deregulated economy, which is to sustain a status divide between persons who pursue occupation within and outside of the formal economy. Without democratised institutions of work and welfare, individual choices could become fixed. Choosing to have more time for care or leisure would demand leaving the labour market as this would be characterised by intensified work time. Those who choose to leave the labour market – to care or to leisure – would re-enter on unfavourable terms. On the other hand, those in careers who want to slow down their work time would fear losing their career, and hence – in this sense – be locked in jobs without opportunities to choose to distribute their time across other life task activities (leisure and care). The consequence would be that individuals can only choose once according to their preference for a lazy or crazy lifestyle (to use Van Parijs's, 1995, terms), because once the choice is made it would be hard to reverse. This I think is not what Van Parijs intends. Therefore, to realise what I believe his analogy of lazy and crazy preferences means, namely that individuals should have continuous options, it is important to combine the basic income with democratised work through social insurance.

In short, what is needed is to revive a politics of decommodification that does not resurrect a set of either/or premises in terms of the choice to work or leisure inside and outside of formal production. We can emphasise employment without treating non-employment as a threat; and we are more likely to promote non-employment by getting the employment system right. This new politics, however, depends on a combination of basic income and the broader commitment to social insurance of social democracy. Social insurance based on progressive taxation helps to prevent the rise of an uneven opportunity structure. As shown, the consequences of such a structure are to raise economic uncertainty and to encourage status distinctions that respectively casualise and intensify work, thereby limiting our control over time. This loss of control pertains both to those individuals subject to intensified work as a condition of keeping their jobs, and to those excluded from structured work, as exemplified in the spending on control of those on income support in liberal economies. Given the way, then, that inequality gives rise to diminished control, it is clear that a basic income will have a much more limited impact on freedom in countries with high inequality. This is a pertinent reason to underline the importance to a realistic new politics of decommodification of combining the advocacy for a basic income with a parallel defence of social democracy.

Notes

¹ The y axis is a composite index of the structure of tax, including the marginal level and degree of progressiveness of income taxation as well as the overall level of tax (in Gross Domestic Product).

² Social spending – on pensions, health, social services and income support – is entered in absolute figures. For the index, see Table A.1.

³ A similar systemic argument for the universal lowering of work time is made in Fitzpatrick (2003: 124).

⁴ This composite index can be found in Table A.5, column 7.

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Table A.1: Public revenue progressiveness and public expenditure on human development, OECD

Column Country	1			2		3	4	5	
	(a) Upper marginal tax rate.	(b) Upper as % of lower marginal rate/10.	(c) Total tax revenue in GDP	(a) Public expenditure on (a) education	(b) social spending as % of GDP, 2005				
Denmark	63.0	14.7	48.9	126.6	8.3	27.6	1.43	0.7	406.6
Finland	58.5	10.7	43.0	112.2	6.3	22.2	0.71	0.7	289.2
Sweden	67.2	13.9	48.2	129.3	7.0	31.1	1.10	0.6	341.1
Norway	53.7	12.5	43.4	109.6	7.0	25.1	0.63	0.5	278.1
Germany	44.3	7.4	36.2	87.9	4.5	27.6	0.62	0.1	189.6
Holland	52.0	9.5	38.0	99.5	5.2	20.7	0.84	0.1	218.7
Belgium	69.4	9.7	44.4	123.5	6.0	26.5	0.85	0.3	261.5
Switzerland	42.8	13.9	39.7	96.4	5.7	20.7	0.63	0.2	217.7
Austria	41.9	7.3	49.2	91.1	5.4	26.1	0.46	0.3	210.1
France	59.6	13.3	43.6	116.5	5.7	28.7	0.66	0.4	248.7
Spain	28.0	6.2	37.2	71.4	4.2	20.3	0.65	0.4	209.3
Portugal	55.6	11.8	36.6	104.0	5.4	23.5	0.52	0.0	235.5
Italy	61.1	11.4	43.3	115.8	4.4	24.2	0.40	0.2	172.2
Hungary	64.8	11.8	39.3	115.9	5.5	22.7	0.20	0.1	162.7
Czech Republic	55.9	11.8	36.4	104.1	4.3	21.1	0.12	0.1	129.1
Poland	45.2	10.0	33.5	88.7	5.5	22.9	0.38	0.0	208.9
Slovak Republic	42.8	9.6	29.8	82.2	3.9	17.3	0.17	0.1	122.3
Ireland	49.0	15.6	32.2	97.6	4.8	15.9	0.51	0.3	192.9
UK	47.7	11.7	36.6	96.0	5.4	20.1	0.12	0.4	180.1
US	43.3	12.7	28.3	84.3	5.1	16.2	0.10	0.1	138.2
Australia	44.8	11.4	41.9	98.1	4.8	17.9	0.19	0.2	152.9
New Zealand	39.0	18.6	36.0	93.6	6.2	18.0	0.27	0.1	179
Japan	34.0	11.4	27.0	68.4	3.5	17.7	0.08	0.2	115.7
South Korea	23.9	12.0	28.7	64.6	4.4	5.7	0.10	0.1	113.7
Mexico	29.8	20.8	20.5	71.1	5.5	6.8	0.02	0.0	120.8
OECD			35.9	96.4	5.4	20.7			203.8

Sources: Column 1: (a) marginal personal income tax and social security contribution rates for average single person without dependants at multiple 167% of the average wage (average annual gross wage earnings of adult full-time manual and non-manual workers. (OECD, 2007d) (b) 167% multiple as % of 67% multiple – to indicate level of progressiveness of tax divided by 10; source: OECD (2007d); (c) total tax revenue as % of GDP, 2007; source: OECD (2008b); Column 2: (a) OECD (2008a); (b) OECD (2007c) (income support, pensions, social services and health); Column 3: OECD (2007a); Column 4: OECD social family database 2008

Table A.2: School attainment, and public-private resources/tudents in primary and secondary schooling, OECD

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Country	Pop. that has attained upper sec. education, age 25-34, %, 2006	Students in publicly funded schools (>secondary), %, 2006	Spending on education that is public, > post-sec. non-tertiary, %, 2005	Student/ staff ratio, state schools, 2007	Student/staff ratio, private schools, 2007	5 as % of 4	School equality score, columns 1 + 2 + 3 + 6 (where 6 is maximum of 100)
Denmark	88	100	98	11.8	12.6	107	386
Finland	90	100	100	9.9	12.5	126	390
Sweden	91	100	100	12.1	11.4	94	385
Norway	83	100+	99	-	-	100	382
Germany	84	100	98	15.8	13.0	87	369
Holland	81	100	97	16.2	16.2	100	378
Belgium	82	100	95	9.1	9.7	107	375
Switzerland	88	94	100				
Austria	87	100	97	10.5	11.8	112	379
France	82	99	94	13.9	15.5	111	375
Spain	64	95	94	11.2	15.0	134	353
Portugal	44	92	100	8.0	8.9	111	347
Italy	67	95	96	10.3	7.3	71	329
Turkey	37	98	93	16.7	7.9	47	275
Hungary	86	100	98	11.3	11.1	99	383
Czech Republic	94	100	92	10.4	10.3	84	370
Poland	64	97	98	12.8	9.2	77	336
Slovak Republic	94	100	90	14.1	13.2	94	378
Ireland	82	99	97	15.5	16.3	105	378
UK	76	94	87	18.6	7.2	39	296
US	87	91	95	15.7	10.7	68	341
Australia	80	100	86	12.3	11.9	111	377
New Zealand	78	96	85	17.0	15.9	94	353
Japan	99	90	92	15.2	13.2	87	361
South Korea	97	99	82	20.8	20.8	100	378
Mexico	39	88	83	35.8	23.8	66	276
Chile	64	94	73	26.6	25.2	63	294
OECD	78	96	92	13.8	12.7	92	358

Notes: Column 2: including both public and government-dependent private institutions; as distinct from pure fee-paying independent schools (combined average of primary and secondary schooling). Norway based on 2000, 2005 figure not available. Columns 4-6: lower secondary education. Sources: OECD (2007b, 2008a)

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Table A.3: Relative employment and income returns to education, females, 2007

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9
Country	Lower secondary education employment rate	1 as % of tertiary education employment rate	Relative lower secondary education income return rate (IRR)	Relative tertiary education IRR	3 as % of 4	Earnings dispersion (score: 200–*10)	Unemployment rate (score: 10–rate, to min. of 0)	Composite variable, columns 1+2+5+6+7
Denmark	55	63	84	126	67	5.9 (141)	4.1 (5.9)	333.9
Finland	61	73	97	146	66	7.7 (123)	6.6 (3.4)	326.4
Sweden	65	73	86	126	68	6.3 (137)	5.1 (4.9)	347.9
Norway	59	68	81	135	60	6.9 (131)	2.5 (7.5)	325.5
Germany	49	61	83	153	54	10.3 (97)	10.0 -	261
Holland	52	62	72	155	46	7.1 (129)	3.8 (6.2)	295.2
Austria	49	61	71	158	45	11.2 (88)	4.6 (5.4)	248.4
Belgium	45	55	81	134	60	3.9 (161)	7.9 (2.1)	321.1
Switzerland	58	71	77	159	48	7.9 (121)	4.3 (5.7)	303.7
France	60	77	82	146	56	9.3 (107)	8.2 (1.8)	301.8
Spain	50	63	78	141	44	8.4 (116)	10.2 -	273
Portugal	74	87	66	173	38	16.5 (35)	8.5 (1.5)	235.5
Italy	43	56	73	138	53	13.6 (63)	7.4 (2.6)	217.6
Turkey	20	31	43	154	28	10.2 (98)	8.7 (1.3)	178.3
Hungary	35	45	72	189	38	14.6 (54)	6.9 (3.1)	175.3
Czech Republic	40	52	73	163	45	7.4 (129)	8.0 (2.0)	268
Poland	30	37	76	165	45	11.3 (87)	12.9 -	199
Ireland	48	56	68	168	40	13.9 (61)	3.3 (6.7)	211.7
UK	48	55	69	177	38	12.9 (71)	3.6 (6.4)	218.4
US	46	59	63	170	37	14.8 (52)	3.8 (6.2)	200.4
Australia	61	75	86	146	59	8.9 (111)	4.0 (6.0)	312
New Zealand	58	72	88	123	71	9.4 (106)	2.8 (7.2)	314.2
Canada	53	67	68	144	47	16.2 (38)	5.2 (4.8)	209.8
South Korea	59	98	75	176	43	13.5 (65)	2.3 (7.7)	272.5
OECD	50	63						264.6

Notes: column 6: elaborated as follows: 200 minus (2 * the percentage of the 25- to 64-year-old population that earns more than two times the median); column 7: female unemployment rate, all levels of education.

Source: OECD (2008a: appendices)

Table A.4: Public spending on labour market programmes and characteristics of income maintenance systems, 2005

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	Replacement rate of unemployment insurance – average start rate*	Training and job creation, public, % in GDP	Administration o job placements, % in GDP	Public spending on childcare, as % of GDP	Composite variable for school equality (from Table A1)	Composite welfare system variable: 1. Column 1 2. Column 2 (* 100) 3. Column 4 (* 100) 4. Column 5
Denmark	90	1.43	0.04	0.7	386	689
Finland	90	0.71	0.10	0.7	390	621
Sweden	80	1.10	0.08	0.6	385	635
Norway	75	0.63	0.08	0.5	382	570
Germany	67	0.62	0.08	0.1	369	508
Holland	70	0.84	0.18	0.1	378	542
Austria	55	0.46	0.07	0.3	379	510
Belgium	52	0.85	0.04	0.2	375	532
France	66	0.66	0.16	0.4	375	547
Spain	65	0.65	0.03	0.4	353	523
Portugal	65	0.52	0.04	0.0	347	464
Italy	40	0.40	0.01	0.2	329	429
Greece		0.05	0.01			
Hungary	65	0.20	0.04	0.1	383	478
Czech Republic	45	0.12	0.04	0.1	370	480
Poland	32	0.38	--	0.0	336	406
Slovak Republic	50	0.17	0.01	0.1	378	455
Ireland	13	0.51	0.04	0.3	378	472
UK	41	0.12	0.21	0.4	296	389
US	50	0.10	0.01	0.1	341	411
Australia	70	0.19	0.13	0.2	377	486
New Zealand	28	0.27	0.02	0.1	353	418
Canada		0.16	0.20			
Japan	70	0.08	0.10	0.2	361	459
South Korea	50	0.10	0.01	0.1	378	448
OECD	73	0.46	0.07		358	498

Sources: Column 1: based on Vodopivec (2004: 53–8)

Column 2: Public spending in GDP on training, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation and start-up incentives (OECD, 2008c)
 Column 3: Public employment services and administration, of which placement and related services only, OECD (2008c)
 Column 4: OECD social family database

Table A.5: Structure of employment time, OECD, 2006

Country	1 Average annual leisure hours	2 Share of part-time employment	3 Share of part-time employment, males	4 Share of part-time employment, females	5 Males' part-time share as % of females' share	6 Paid maternity and paternity leave, months F M Total	7 Composed variable: 1. Column 1 (/100) 2. Column 5 (/2) 3. Column 6, and 4. Column 9 Table A.3 (/10)
Denmark	1577	18.1	11.4	25.6	45	18 1 20.0	91.66
Finland	1392	11.4	8.1	14.9	54	16.9 5.7 22.6	96.16
Sweden	1417	13.4	8.4	19.0	44	9.6 9.3 18.9	89.86
Norway	1593	21.1	10.6	32.9	32	9.0 6.0 15.0	79.48
Germany	1660	21.9	7.6	39.2	19	14.0 - 14.0	66.2
Holland	1664	35.5	16.8	59.7	28	16.0 0.4 16.4	76.56
France	1532	19.9	5.1	22.9	22	16.0 2.0 18.0	74.4
Spain	1282	11.1	3.9	21.4	18	16.0 2.0 18.0	67.12
Portugal	1306	9.3	5.9	29.4	20	17.0 2.0 19.0	65.61
Hungary	1210	2.7	1.5	4.2	36	16.8 1.0 17.8	65.43
Poland	1042	10.8	6.5	16.3	40	18.0 4.0 22.0	62.84
Ireland	1443	19.9	7.7	34.9	22	18.2 - 18.2	48.34
UK	1312	23.4	9.9	38.8	25	9.3 0.3 9.6	45.12
US	1191	12.6	7.8	17.8	44	- -	53.95
New Zealand	1241	21.3	10.1	34.5	29	6.0 - 6.0	67.33
South Korea	698	8.8	6.3	12.3	51	15.0 - 15.0	59.73
OECD	1347.5	16.0	6.5	27.0 28.7	31*	15.66	68.30

* This average is based on 27 countries, including Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Slovak Republic, Switzerland and Turkey.

Source: source for all columns, figures from (OECD, 2007a: statistical annex), unless otherwise specified

Column 1: leisure hours defined as 3,000 - average annual hours actually worked by person in employment, 2006

Column 2: part-time employment as a share of total employment, 2006

Column 6: from OECD family database, 2006/07